The grotesque alliance that has been allowed to carve up Syria
The grotesque alliance that has been allowed to carve up Syria
Far from destroying each other, Isil and the Assad regime have both become more powerful
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Photo: AFP/Getty Images
8:17PM BST 25 Aug 2014
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If a retired tyrant chose to write a guidebook entitled “How to be an Arab
Dictator”, what would be the most important lesson? It might be summarised
thus: “When you are in trouble, fan the flames of Islamist extremism so that
your enemies will look even worse than you.”
This time-honoured trick can work wonders for the beleaguered autocrat. If he
pulls it off, some venerable figures in the West might even argue that he is
just the man to quell the very conflagration that he helped to ignite.
So it is with Bashar al-Assad, the chief arsonist of Syria, who is now being
hailed as ideally qualified for the post of fireman. The rise of the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) has apparently convinced the likes of
Lord Dannatt, a former Army commander, and Sir Christopher Meyer, once our
Ambassador in Washington, that we must reach an accommodation with Assad in
order to suppress a common threat.
But this view of Assad rests on a crucial misunderstanding of Syria’s civil
war. And the cast of mind that it betrays – the notion that, yes, Assad
might have butchered his people on a grotesque scale, but he is still
preferable to any alternative – was a big part of the reason why the Commons
rejected military action against Syria a year ago this week. That vote was
also a mistake with baleful consequences, for reasons that we’ll come to.
But first, let’s address the case that Assad is a bulwark against Isil. This
amounts to the see-saw view of Syria’s war: if Isil rises, then Assad
declines. The way to bring down Isil is to build up Assad. After all, he is
a secular leader who stands in the path of Isil’s zealots and their burning
ambition to replace his regime with an Islamic state.
Yet this cannot explain the most striking development of the last year, namely
that Isil and Assad have both grown stronger in parallel. When Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi carved out his “Islamic State” in the desert sand, he was not
always struggling against the regime’s bitter opposition; on the contrary,
his advances were often helped by Assad’s offensives against rival rebel
factions. In other words, Isil has not achieved its victories in the teeth
of dogged resistance from the secular dictator; rather, Baghdadi has been
enabled by Assad’s pitiless campaign to hold power.
In line with the oldest trick of the dictator-at-bay, Assad has done his best to conjure up enemies who are even more blood-soaked and repulsive than himself. The evidence suggests that he has deliberately created some of the conditions for Isil’s rise.
As recently as 2012, after all, Baghdadi’s extremists were a weakened force confined to a small area of Iraq. Then Assad released a cohort of Syria’s most dangerous jihadists from Sednaya jail near Damascus. Some of these men – along with others freed in later amnesties – are believed to have become Isil commanders.
Bolstered by this inflow of seasoned leaders, Isil moved into Syria and captured oilfields in the eastern desert. Remarkably, Assad’s regime then began buying oil from Isil, according to officials from the West and Middle East. In this brazen way, the dictator actually helped to fund Baghdadi.
Meanwhile, close observers of the war have noticed a pattern. Assad has mobilised every ounce of strength and every possible weapon, including poison gas, for use against the non-Islamist rebels. Day after day, his tanks, artillery and strike aircraft pound the remaining strongholds of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
But Isil has often been spared this punishment. Although Baghdadi’s men control thousands of square miles, they have sometimes appeared immune from the attentions of Assad’s forces, notably his attack helicopters, which specialise in dropping hideous barrel bombs.
Last year, Isil established their headquarters in a prominent location in the town of Raqqa in eastern Syria. Assad’s air force finally got around to bombing this building in June – but only after it had been evacuated.
Meanwhile, Isil’s own campaign has often been fought in a way that helps the regime. Until recently, Baghdadi concentrated on fighting other rebels, particularly the FSA. When Isil reached what may turn out to be the apex of its strength earlier this year, Baghdadi chose not to march on Damascus and threaten Assad’s grip on power. Instead, he turned in the opposite direction and invaded Iraq, thereby sparking today’s crisis – and the calls for the West to bury the hatchet with Assad.
Perhaps this will all change. On Sunday, Isil overcame the regime’s forces to capture Tabqa airbase and advance closer towards Aleppo. Baghdadi and Assad may now be preparing for a battle for control of this ancient city. The two enemies could finally start behaving like enemies. But the events of the last year have demonstrated their willingness, at the very least, to be opportunistic tactical allies.
In the process, Assad has forced us to choose between supporting him, or watching the very jihadists whom he has empowered advance across the Middle East. Lord Dannatt and Sir Christopher Meyer have duly urged us to sign up the arsonist as a fireman, hoping that Assad can be trusted to refrain from picking up the petrol and going back to his old career.
In truth, this is the bankrupt choice which the House of Commons made – perhaps unwittingly – a year ago. By deciding against striking Assad even after he had gassed hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent people, Parliament effectively resolved to leave events in Syria to take their course. And that meant allowing Assad and Baghdadi, the two most powerful warlords, to carve up the country between them. The non-Islamist opposition was duly ground to dust between these two millstones.
Some MPs voted against military action because they claimed to be unconvinced of Assad’s responsibility for the gas attacks. I trust they have now read in horror and shame the reams of evidence establishing his regime’s guilt.
Others made that decision because Western intelligence was wrong about weapons of mass destruction in another country more than a decade earlier. I hope they have compared Syria’s official declaration of its chemical arsenal with the declassified assessments of French and British intelligence – and noted that the latter were vindicated.
Most remarkably of all, many MPs said that bombing Assad would make Syria’s plight even worse. So let’s recap: 191,000 people have now been killed in Syria, making Assad’s struggle to subdue his people the Middle East’s bloodiest conflict since 1945, with the sole exception of the eight-year confrontation between Iran and Iraq. How could things possibly have been worse? Aside from a plague of locusts, is there a single calamity that Syria has escaped?
If we had struck Assad last year, we are told that Isil would have advanced. But that has happened anyway. Meanwhile the non-Islamist opposition, which had staked everything on outside intervention, has been eclipsed. Parliament sent a signal that Western power – the one factor that could have tipped the balance of the conflict – would never be deployed. The result was to leave the field to our twin nightmares, Assad and Baghdadi, the arsonists-in-arms.
Who would be a moderate now?
In line with the oldest trick of the dictator-at-bay, Assad has done his best to conjure up enemies who are even more blood-soaked and repulsive than himself. The evidence suggests that he has deliberately created some of the conditions for Isil’s rise.
As recently as 2012, after all, Baghdadi’s extremists were a weakened force confined to a small area of Iraq. Then Assad released a cohort of Syria’s most dangerous jihadists from Sednaya jail near Damascus. Some of these men – along with others freed in later amnesties – are believed to have become Isil commanders.
Bolstered by this inflow of seasoned leaders, Isil moved into Syria and captured oilfields in the eastern desert. Remarkably, Assad’s regime then began buying oil from Isil, according to officials from the West and Middle East. In this brazen way, the dictator actually helped to fund Baghdadi.
Meanwhile, close observers of the war have noticed a pattern. Assad has mobilised every ounce of strength and every possible weapon, including poison gas, for use against the non-Islamist rebels. Day after day, his tanks, artillery and strike aircraft pound the remaining strongholds of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
But Isil has often been spared this punishment. Although Baghdadi’s men control thousands of square miles, they have sometimes appeared immune from the attentions of Assad’s forces, notably his attack helicopters, which specialise in dropping hideous barrel bombs.
Last year, Isil established their headquarters in a prominent location in the town of Raqqa in eastern Syria. Assad’s air force finally got around to bombing this building in June – but only after it had been evacuated.
Meanwhile, Isil’s own campaign has often been fought in a way that helps the regime. Until recently, Baghdadi concentrated on fighting other rebels, particularly the FSA. When Isil reached what may turn out to be the apex of its strength earlier this year, Baghdadi chose not to march on Damascus and threaten Assad’s grip on power. Instead, he turned in the opposite direction and invaded Iraq, thereby sparking today’s crisis – and the calls for the West to bury the hatchet with Assad.
Perhaps this will all change. On Sunday, Isil overcame the regime’s forces to capture Tabqa airbase and advance closer towards Aleppo. Baghdadi and Assad may now be preparing for a battle for control of this ancient city. The two enemies could finally start behaving like enemies. But the events of the last year have demonstrated their willingness, at the very least, to be opportunistic tactical allies.
In the process, Assad has forced us to choose between supporting him, or watching the very jihadists whom he has empowered advance across the Middle East. Lord Dannatt and Sir Christopher Meyer have duly urged us to sign up the arsonist as a fireman, hoping that Assad can be trusted to refrain from picking up the petrol and going back to his old career.
In truth, this is the bankrupt choice which the House of Commons made – perhaps unwittingly – a year ago. By deciding against striking Assad even after he had gassed hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent people, Parliament effectively resolved to leave events in Syria to take their course. And that meant allowing Assad and Baghdadi, the two most powerful warlords, to carve up the country between them. The non-Islamist opposition was duly ground to dust between these two millstones.
Some MPs voted against military action because they claimed to be unconvinced of Assad’s responsibility for the gas attacks. I trust they have now read in horror and shame the reams of evidence establishing his regime’s guilt.
Others made that decision because Western intelligence was wrong about weapons of mass destruction in another country more than a decade earlier. I hope they have compared Syria’s official declaration of its chemical arsenal with the declassified assessments of French and British intelligence – and noted that the latter were vindicated.
Most remarkably of all, many MPs said that bombing Assad would make Syria’s plight even worse. So let’s recap: 191,000 people have now been killed in Syria, making Assad’s struggle to subdue his people the Middle East’s bloodiest conflict since 1945, with the sole exception of the eight-year confrontation between Iran and Iraq. How could things possibly have been worse? Aside from a plague of locusts, is there a single calamity that Syria has escaped?
If we had struck Assad last year, we are told that Isil would have advanced. But that has happened anyway. Meanwhile the non-Islamist opposition, which had staked everything on outside intervention, has been eclipsed. Parliament sent a signal that Western power – the one factor that could have tipped the balance of the conflict – would never be deployed. The result was to leave the field to our twin nightmares, Assad and Baghdadi, the arsonists-in-arms.
Who would be a moderate now?
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