2015 Tianjin explosions
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Location of the explosion
A series of explosions that killed over one hundred people and injured hundreds of others occurred at a
container storage station at the
Port of Tianjin
on Wednesday, 12 August 2015. The first two explosions occurred within
30 seconds of each other at the facility, which is located in the
Binhai New Area of
Tianjin, China.
[3][4] The second explosion was far larger and involved the detonation of about 800 tonnes of Ammonium Nitrate.
[5]
Fires caused by the initial explosions continued to burn uncontrolled
throughout the weekend, repeatedly causing secondary explosions, with
eight additional explosions occurring on Saturday, 15 August.
The cause of the explosions was not immediately known,
[4]
but Chinese state media reported that at least the initial blast was
from unknown hazardous materials in shipping containers at a plant
warehouse owned by Ruihai Logistics,
[6] a firm specialized in handling
hazardous materials.
[3]
Poor coverage of the event and the emergency response to it received criticism.
[7][8][9] The Chinese government also censored the internet and social media using the words "Tianjin" and "explosion",
[10] and announced it had taken down multiple websites for publishing "false" information.
[11]
As of 12 September 2015, the official casualty report was 173 deaths,
[1] 8 missing, and 797 non-fatal injuries.
[2]
Background
Tianjin Dongjiang Port Ruihai International Logistics (
天津东疆保税港区瑞海国际物流有限公司), or Ruihai Logistics (
瑞海物流), is a privately held logistics company established in 2011. It handles
hazardous chemicals within the
Port of Tianjin, such as
compressed air,
flammable and
corrosive substances,
oxidizing agents, and toxic chemicals. The company, which employs 70, is designated by the
Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration (
天津海事局) as an approved agent for handling these hazardous chemicals at the port,
[12] and its operating license was renewed two months prior to the explosions.
[13] Its 46,000-square-metre (500,000 sq ft) site contains multiple warehouses for hazardous goods, a fire pump and a fire pond.
[14]
The warehouse building, owned by Ruihai Logistics, is recorded in a
2014 government document as being a hazardous chemical storage facility
for
calcium carbide,
sodium nitrate, and
potassium nitrate.
[15]
Safety regulations requiring that public buildings and facilities
should be at least 1 kilometre away were not followed, and local
inhabitants were unaware of the danger.
[13][16]
The authorities stated that poor record keeping, damage to the office
facilities and "major discrepancies" with customs meant that they were
unable to identify the substances stored.
[17]
State media revealed that Ruihai had only received its authorisation to
handle dangerous chemicals less than two months earlier, meaning that
it had been operating illegally from October 2014, when its temporary
license had expired, to June 2015.
[18][19]
Explosions
The first reports of a fire at a warehouse in the Binhai New Area
began coming in at around 22:50 local time (14:50 UTC) on 12 August. The
first responders were unable to keep the fire from spreading.
Firefighters who first arrived on the scene proceeded to douse the fire
with water as they were unaware that dangerous chemicals were stored on
the site, thereby setting in motion a series of more violent chemical
reactions.
[13][15]
At around 23:30 (15:30 UTC), the first explosion occurred and
registered as a magnitude 2.3 earthquake, generating seismic shock-waves
energetically equivalent to 3 tonnes of
TNT.
Shortly after, a second more powerful one occurred, causing most of the
damage and injuries with shock-waves felt many kilometres away. The
second explosion generated seismic shock-waves with energy equivalent to
21 tonnes of TNT.
[20] The resulting fireballs reached heights of hundreds of meters.
[21][22][23][24]
Around 11:40 (03:40 UTC) on 15 August, a series of eight smaller
explosions occurred in the port as fire from the original blasts
continued to spread.
[25][26][27]
The explosion was large enough to be photographed by
Himawari, a geostationary meteorological satellite operated by the
Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA).
[28]
Chinese scientists subsequently estimated that the second more powerful
explosion involved the detonation of about 800 tonnes of Ammonium
Nitrate, based on crater size and lethality radius.
[5]
Casualties
As of 12 September 2015, 173 people are confirmed to have died from the explosions and 797 others have been injured, according to official reports.
[2][1]. However, independent sources have suggested the actual number of casualties may have been over 1400.
[29]
Media reported the area to be densely populated, with around 5,600
families living within 1.5 km radius of the plant, the closest being
only 600 m away.
[13][30]
Neither the developers nor the buyers were aware of the latent dangers
of the activities at the nearby site; developers claimed also to be
victims.
[31][30] According to the Tianjin government, more than 700 people were injured by the explosion,
[32] many with extensive injuries, mostly from
burns and
explosive blast injuries. Over a thousand firefighters were on scene, 95 of whom have died.
[33][34] One surviving firefighter, a 19-year-old named Zhou Ti (
周倜), was found on the morning of 14 August.
[3][35][36][37]
The death toll of the incident, which also includes 11 police officers,
is reported to be the worst for Chinese front line responders since the
founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
[38][39]
Damage
Photographs and videos showed extensive destruction in and around the warehouse compound,
[40][41] with a massive crater at the blast site.
[19] The buildings of seven more surrounding logistics companies were destroyed,
[42] and large quantities of
intermodal container stacks have been toppled and thrown by the forces of the explosions.
[40] More than eight thousand new cars from
Hyundai,
Kia,
Volkswagen,
Renault, and
Toyota, parked in lots located near the blast site, have been largely
burned as a result of the initial explosions.
[43][44] Jaguar Land Rover had some 5,800 vehicles at the port and "many" were damaged or destroyed.
[45] Multiple buildings surrounding the blast site have been called "structurally unsafe".
[citation needed]
Apartment blocks 2 km (1.2 mi) from the site sustained shattered
glass, loss of roof tiles and damage to ceilings – with 17,000 units
being affected.
[37][46] Nearby
Donghai Road Station suffered severe damage as a result of the explosions and is closed indefinitely, as has the rest of
Line 9 of the Tianjin Metro since 13 August.
[47] A Japanese department store four kilometres away reported damage to walls and ceilings.
[48] The explosions also affected the
National Supercomputing Center of Tianjin several kilometres away, knocking out windows and causing some internal ceilings to collapse; the supercomputer
Tianhe-1A itself was not damaged.
[49]
Cause
It is not known what chemicals were being stored at the site.
[16] In addition to vast quantities of
sodium cyanide and calcium carbide, 800 tonnes of
ammonium nitrate and 500 tonnes of potassium nitrate have been discovered at the blast site, according to local reports.
[19] On 17 August, the deputy director of the
public security bureau's fire department told
CCTV:
Over 40 kinds of hazardous chemicals [were stored on site]. As far as
we know, there were ammonium nitrate and potassium nitrate. According
to what we know so far, all together there should have been around 3,000
tonnes.[50]
Ammonium nitrate, which is principally used in manufacturing fertilizer, has been implicated in a number of
other fatal industrial explosions.
A fire department spokesman confirmed that firefighters had used water
in combating the initial fire, which may have led to water being sprayed
on calcium carbide, releasing the highly volatile gas
acetylene. This may have detonated the ammonium nitrate.
[51]
Pollution
At least 700 tonnes of highly toxic
sodium cyanide was stored at the site – 70 times the legal limit.
[52][53][54] Sodium cyanide leakage has been reported in the sewer.
[55][56]
On 13 August, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides, all
of which are toxic, were detected within 500 m (1,600 ft) of the origin
of the explosion, but the levels conformed with the national standards.
The government maintained that gases were undetectable 2 km (1.2 mi)
from the site during initial testing on 14 August.
[17]
With the first rains after the initial explosions, coming on 18
August, white chemical foam covered the streets. Citizens complained of
burning sensations and rashes on sensitive skin parts after coming into
contact with rain droplets. However, meteorologists sought to reassure
the public that the rain was not directly harmful to health, whilst the
Environment Protection Board advised against exposure to the rain due to
traces of cyanide dust reacting with water.
[57]
Thousands of dead
sticklebacks
washed up on the banks 6 km from the explosion site on 20 August,
fuelling fears of water contamination. Officials downplayed the fears,
saying that there were not high levels of cyanide in the river and that
the fish likely died due to oxygen depletion in the water.
[58]
Rain on 25 August 2015 in the Binhai New Area brought more complaints
of skin burns from volunteers and journalists. A bright white foam also
appeared on the streets. Deng Xiaowen, director of Tianjin's
environmental monitoring centre, stated that the foam was "a normal
phenomenon when rain falls, and similar things have occurred before".
[59]
Aftermath and emergency response
Tianjin officials, initially concerned at public response, announced
that 14 people had perished in the explosions, but were forced to raise
the death toll to 44 once the scale of the explosions became clear. The
South China Morning Post
(SCMP) cited a Tianjin police source that officers had been instructed
to remove bodies from the scene to deliberately understate the official
death toll.
[60]
The morning following the explosion military personnel began to
arrive in Tianjin to help with the search and recovery efforts. Extra
equipment, such as bulldozers, were brought in to help with the clean-up
operation. Over 200 nuclear and biochemical experts, including a team
from the
International Atomic Energy Agency,
began arriving in Tianjin to assess the health risks from the chemicals
being released into the atmosphere. Government personnel set up twelve
temporary monitoring stations near the blast site with above normal
levels of "harmful air pollutants" being detected. A nearby drainage
outlet was also closed, and water quality tested.
[61]
Firefighting was suspended on the afternoon of 13 August due to the
uncertainty of the content and quantity of hazardous materials being
stored on site. A team of over 200 chemical specialists was deployed to
the site to assess the hazardous materials on site and dangers to the
environment, and to determine the best way to put out the remaining
fires and proceed with search and rescue and clean-up operations.
[22]
Later that day, rescue personnel were dispatched in an attempt to
remove the 700 tonnes of sodium cyanide believed to be stored at the
site, with
hydrogen peroxide being prepared to neutralise the chemicals.
[62]
Daily press conferences were organised. A press conference organised by
local officials held on 14 August came to an abrupt end when a
journalist began asking questions as to why such dangerous chemicals
were stockpiled so near to housing estates.
[31]
Initially, more than 3,500 area residents were staying in temporary shelters,
[62] but the number surpassed six thousand within three days.
[63] The government issued an evacuation order over concerns of further explosions; not all residents complied.
[37]
Several hours after the initial blast, at 3:30 am on 13 August, Tianjin mayor and acting Communist Party Secretary
Huang Xingguo arrived at
TEDA Hospital to visit injured victims. Shortly thereafter,
Guo Shengkun, the
Minister of Public Security, visited the blast site in Tianjin and called for all-out efforts to save lives.
[64] The next few days saw more senior officials visit the explosion site, including Vice-Premier
Liu Yandong, Vice-Premier
Ma Kai, and Premier
Li Keqiang accompanied by State Councilor
Yang Jing. At the press conferences, the district governor of Binhai New Area addressed the press.
[65]
On 15 August, local authorities ordered the evacuation of residents
within a 3 km (1.9 mi) radius of the blast site, prompted by the threat
of "toxic substances",
[66] including
sodium cyanide.
[27]
The State Council ordered inspections of all businesses using dangerous chemicals and explosives across the country.
[16][52]
Ownership
Hong Kong media disclosed that Li Liang, the major shareholder –
owning 55%, was the nephew of former chairman of the CPPCC National
Committee
Li Ruihuan,
who had been de facto leader of the Tianjin clique, and that the
company may have been named after his brother and Li Liang's father;
[13] the remaining 45% is owned by Shu Zheng.
[67]
However, according to confessions to state media a week after the
initial explosions, Ruihai is owned via proxies by Yu Xuewei, a former
senior executive at
Sinochem,
and Dong Shexuan, who serves as the company's vice-president and is now
in police custody. Dong Shexuan is the son of Tianjin port's former
police chief Dong Peijun, who was a colleague of
Wu Changshun, the former chief of the
public security bureau of Tianjin.
[68][69] The
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
(CCDI), CPC's anti-corruption body, charged Wu Changshun with bribery
in 2014; Dong Peijun was also under investigation for corruption, but
died that year.
[69]
Investigation
After the explosions, the CCDI placed
Yang Dongliang, Director of the
State Administration of Work Safety
and China's highest work-safety official, under investigation on 18
August 2015. Yang had previously served as Tianjin's vice mayor for 11
years. In 2012, Yang Dongliang had issued an order to loosen rules for
the handling of hazardous substances, which may have enabled Ruihai to
store toxic chemicals such as sodium cyanide.
[69]
On 27 August, Xinhua reported that police had arrested twelve people
with suspected connections to the explosions, including Ruihai
Logistics' chairman, vice-chairman, and at least three other managers,
with the other seven people unnamed.
[70]
Media coverage
Professional media
Tianjin authorities banned editors and reporters from sharing information about the disaster on
Weibo and
WeChat, and websites were ordered to follow state media.
[71]
The Tianjin internet police warned social media users to use only official casualty figures.
[72]
Tianjin Television had reported the explosion on their early morning news at 7:00 am,
[73][74]
but citizens complained that the station had not reported live nor
updated on the event, instead showing soap operas eight hours later.
[7][8][9]
Social media
A great deal of specific information on the event, including the
majority of early stage video was first released over social media
sites, and in particular
microblogging platforms like
Weibo. Major media has drawn heavily from social media sources, greatly widening the audience.
The Economist
noted, "Social media fills in the blanks left by official narratives of
the Tianjin disaster. The most remarkable feature of the aftermath of
the explosions in Tianjin, in northern China, has been the extraordinary
contrast between the official reaction to the crisis, which has been
profoundly flawed, and the online reaction, which has entirely dominated
the agenda."
[75]
Censorship and criticism
Professional and social media reports were
censored by Chinese authorities.
[76] The censorship rate increased tenfold on the social media site
Weibo,
[77]
with users reporting that their posts regarding the blasts are being
deleted, with "Tianjin" and "explosion" being the most censored words.
[7][8][10][78] An article by
Caijing,
which carried an interview with a firefighter who said that no-one on
the front line had been informed of the dangerous chemicals on site that
would react exothermically when mixed with water, was deleted after it
had been reposted 10,000 times; many other posts mentioning the
existence of deadly sodium cyanide were also expunged.
[10]
The
Cyberspace Administration of China
banned all journalists from posting to social media, and insisted on
strict adherence to Xinhua copy. On 15 August, it announced that it had
shut down 18 websites and suspended 32 more for spreading false
information.
[11][79][80][81][82]
More than 360 Weibo and public WeChat accounts which had allegedly been
spreading such false rumors have been "punished according to laws". Of
these accounts, over 160 were shut down permanently.
[83]
Press freedom organization
Reporters Without Borders
(RSF) accused the Chinese state media of playing up the heroic efforts
of rescue workers and firefighters while downplaying the causes of the
explosions and the number of casualties. RSF said that censorship by the
Chinese authorities showed "a flagrant indifference to the public's
legitimate concerns".
[11]
A CNN correspondent was interrupted by bystanders and forced to leave during a live report outside
TEDA Hospital.
[7][84]
A journalist from the Beijing News reported that he and two other
reporters were chased by police, caught, searched, and made to delete
photographs from their cameras and computers.
[85]
Reactions
Immediately following the blasts the company website was taken down
fuelling suspicions that an attempt was being made to shield owners with
powerful political connections.
[86][13][67]
For several successive days, local residents seeking compensation for
their homes protested in front of the venue of the daily press
conference, they were joined by distraught families of missing
firefighters, and confronted police angrily.
[46][52][54]
The Chinese public security minister threatened to severely punish
those found to be responsible for the explosions. However, the
authorities did not release any significant information for several days
about the chemicals and circumstances, causing public anger to mount
during this time.
[87][88] Marking an official change of tack that suggested top-level endorsement,
[60] the official
People's Daily joined in to criticise local officials' lack of candour and their use of bureaucratic jargon.
[46][88] In addition, the
Global Times
remarked on the inadequacy of emergency response and the reluctance of
high-ranking officials to answer the public's questions and address
their concerns until four days after the blasts.
[46] The
People's Daily
acknowledged that public scepticism of the reported death toll was
fuelling rampant rumours; there was also disquiet over the emergency
assistance provided and the way the aftermath was being handled.
[89][90]
Attempting to defuse widespread anger at the lack of official
transparency, mouthpieces of the ruling party declared that
investigations would be thorough and transparent.
[91]
Former deputy mayor, Yang Dongliang, was put under investigation for
corruption; mayor Huang Xingguo proclaimed his "unshirkable
responsibility for this accident".
[88][92]
Authorities also released information about the ownership of Ruihai, as
well as a confession by one beneficial owner for the proxy
shareholdings.
[88]
Meanwhile, Greenpeace Asia alleged that two
Sinochem
subsidiaries – Sinochem Tianjin Binhai Logistics Company (with a
130,000-square-metre (1,400,000 sq ft) site) and Tianjin Port Sinochem
Hazardous Goods Logistics Company Ltd. – had warehouses in the vicinity
in close proximity to a primary and a nursery school, meaning that both
were also in similar breach of laws.
[92]
Observers state that top officials always attempt to show such
disasters as isolated instances, have never accepted political
accountability nor addressed the underlying governance issues, and have
always heavily censored any criticism of the central government.
[87][88] Willy Lam, professor at
CUHK and senior fellow at
The Jamestown Foundation, noted the highly unusual 4 days it took for
Li Keqiang
to make an official visit, suggesting that the lack of a top-ranking
visitor to a major disaster site within 48 hours despite the proximity
to Beijing reflected "division among the leadership on who should be the
fall guy."
[16][52][87]
Clean-up and redress
Tianjin officials announced that as at the deadline on Thursday, 3
September, more than 9,000 households out of some 17,000 affected by the
explosions had signed agreements to settle their damages claims. It was
reported that some had chosen to sell their damaged apartments to
private developers, who offered them around 130% of the original
purchase price, while others agreed to accept local government to make
good their damaged apartments for free. The local government offered an
additional of ¥20,000 renminbi ($3,100) to those who agreed to settle
their claims by the deadline.
New York Times journalists,
however, reported that some owners had faced heavy pressure from
government officials to settle; similarly, owners who were employees in
state-owned enterprises were under threat of dismissal from their bosses
for not settling.
[93][94]
On 10 September 2015
China Daily
reported that families of the firefighters killed in the explosions
would each receive compensation of 2.3 million yuan (US$360,669), citing
a report in Beijing News. It was also reported that a monument would be
built on the site and that the government planned to compensate
residents whose houses were damaged by repurchasing them at 1.3 times
their purchase price.
[95]
See also
References
Fireball from the first explosion
A series of explosions that killed over one hundred people and injured hundreds of others occurred at a container storage station at the Port of Tianjin on Wednesday, 12 August 2015. The first two explosions occurred within 30 seconds of each other at the facility, which is located in the Binhai New Area of Tianjin, China.[3][4] The second explosion was far larger and involved the detonation of about 800 tonnes of Ammonium Nitrate.[5] Fires caused by the initial explosions continued to burn uncontrolled throughout the weekend, repeatedly causing secondary explosions, with eight additional explosions occurring on Saturday, 15 August.Location of the explosion
Damaged car and building
Damaged buses
Photographs and videos showed extensive destruction in and around the warehouse compound,[40][41] with a massive crater at the blast site.[19] The buildings of seven more surrounding logistics companies were destroyed,[42] and large quantities of intermodal container stacks have been toppled and thrown by the forces of the explosions.[40] More than eight thousand new cars from Hyundai, Kia, Volkswagen, Renault, and Toyota, parked in lots located near the blast site, have been largely burned as a result of the initial explosions.[43][44] Jaguar Land Rover had some 5,800 vehicles at the port and "many" were damaged or destroyed.[45] Multiple buildings surrounding the blast site have been called "structurally unsafe".[citation needed]Damaged building
At least 700 tonnes of highly toxic sodium cyanide was stored at the site – 70 times the legal limit.[52][53][54] Sodium cyanide leakage has been reported in the sewer.[55][56] On 13 August, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides, all of which are toxic, were detected within 500 m (1,600 ft) of the origin of the explosion, but the levels conformed with the national standards. The government maintained that gases were undetectable 2 km (1.2 mi) from the site during initial testing on 14 August.[17]Heavy smoke
Tianjin officials, initially concerned at public response, announced that 14 people had perished in the explosions, but were forced to raise the death toll to 44 once the scale of the explosions became clear. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) cited a Tianjin police source that officers had been instructed to remove bodies from the scene to deliberately understate the official death toll.[60]
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