Thus, the Sunni militants are likely to come up against a far more
determined and numerous foe than they have confronted so far. The most
likely outcome of that fighting will be a vicious stalemate at or north
of Baghdad, basically along Iraq’s ethno-sectarian divide. That is also
not surprising because it conforms to the pattern of many similar
intercommunal civil wars. In Syria today, in Lebanon in the 1980s,
Afghanistan in the 1990s, and elsewhere, that is where the frontlines
tend to stalemate. They can shift here and there in small ways, but
generally remain unchanged for years. That’s because militias in civil
wars find it far easier to hold territory inhabited by the members of
their identity group than to conquer (and hold) territory inhabited by
members of a rival identity group. It’s one reason they typically try to
“cleanse” any territory they have conquered of members of the rival
identity group.
If military developments in Iraq conform to this most likely
scenario, they could lead to a protracted, bloody stalemate along those
lines. In that case, one side or the other would have to receive
disproportionately greater military assistance from an outside backer
than its adversary to make meaningful territorial gains. Absent that,
the fighting will probably continue for years and hundreds of thousands
will die.
end partial quote from:
wrote an overview
Pollack also wrote:
Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Studies in War, Society, and the Militar)
Paperback
– September 1, 2004
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