Sunday, November 24, 2013

Things will likely get worse in Libya

Does Libya need a lesson in devolved government?

Spectator.co.uk (blog) - ‎12 hours ago‎
High-politics in Libya is obviously chaotic; but the picture on the ground is encouraging in some locales. The economy and civic society have been flourishing in Mistrata and Tobruk; but violent unrest has broken out in both towns in recent days.
Things will likely get worse in Libya
Libya: What went wrong?
EU expresses worry over Libya's deteriorating security

Things will likely get worse before they get better in Libya

Gwynne Dyer
A little over two years after the former Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi was captured and killed by rebel militiamen outside the town of Sirte, the Libyan state is teetering on the brink of collapse. A dozen different militia organizations have more authority than the central government, and if ordinary civilians protest at their arbitrary rule, they get shot.
That happened in Benghazi, in the east of the country, in June, when 31 peaceful demonstrators were shot dead and many others wounded while protesting outside the barracks of the "Libyan Shield Brigade."
It happened again in Tripoli just over a week ago, when a militia brigade from Misrata that has been roosting in the capital for the past two years used heavy machine-guns on unarmed civilians who were demanding that it go home, killing 43 and wounding hundreds.
In between, there have been some 80 assassinations of senior police and government officials. Last month, the prime minister, Ali Zeidan, was kidnapped by gunmen of the Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room group. Almost all the east and the south of the country is controlled by militias that have seized the main oilfields and ports.
Oil exports, the country’s only significant source of revenue, have dropped from 1.4 million barrels per day last summer to only 200,000 barrels per day. Deprived of most of its income, the government will run out of money to pay its employees next month — including the militias that harass it, for it pays them off too. And once the militias are no longer getting their protection money, things may get even worse in Libya.
The militias now have 225,000 members in a country of only five million people. Only about 10 per cent of the militiamen actually fought in the war, but in a country with 40 per cent unemployment, it’s the best job going, so they do not lack recruits.
And from the beginning, the body that passes for a national government in Libya, lacking any army or police of its own, hired the militias to enforce its authority. As a result, they have become the real authorities.
The eastern half of the country, Cyrenaica, with 80 per cent of the oil, is now in practice a separate entity, run by militias that demand “federalism” but really mean independence.
Prime Minister Zeidan warned in August that “any vessel not under contract to the National Oil Company that approaches the (oil) terminals (in Cyrenaica) will be bombed,” and so far none has dared to — but that means nobody gets the income. It is a truly horrible mess.
Could this have been avoided? Probably not. After 42 years of Gadhafi’s brutal rule, there was no civil society in Libya that could support a democratic government and effectively demand respect for human rights and an end to corruption.
Foreign occupation might have supplied some of the necessary skills to run a modern state, but would have been violently rejected by Libyans. Besides, there were no foreigners willing to take on the job.
You have to start from where you are. Libya is taking much longer than the optimists expected to get to where it needs to be: A democratic state that respects its citizens and enforces the law impartially. At the moment, it’s not even heading in that direction; Prime Minister Zeidan worries that it might become "an Afghanistan or a Somalia."
Probably not. The country’s oil wealth can only flow, whether to the warlords or to the citizens, if there is a reasonable degree of peace and order. That is a powerful incentive to co-operation, even if much of the negotiation seems to be done with guns. And there is a kind of civil society emerging in Libya now; those crowds of protesters that the militias massacred were actually evidence that it exists.
It will be years more before the Libyans manage to sort themselves out, but in the end they probably will. Libya will probably remain a single country, too, although a highly decentralized and federalized one. But it’s very bad now, and it will probably get worse before it gets better.
Gwynne Dyer is an independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.
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Things will likely get worse in Libya

Democracy is very messy and hard to get right because of all the checks and balances that need to be put in place to protect the masses. So, almost no one gets it right right off the bat. But, if things do get a lot worse in Libya then the likelihood is that eventually some strong man not unlike Gadhaffi eventually will govern at least for a while longer. Partly this might happen because people there likely haven't known anything else. Because democracy in theory and democracy in reality are two very very difficult and different things.

If you look at what just happened in the U.S. Senate for example with the end of the filibuster, on one level it is a disaster in the making for a variety of reasons. It takes us down a slippery slope where even Obamacare, Medicare, Social Security and "Every other program enacted in the 20th and 21st century could be overthrown by 51 votes. Can you imagine what fireworks there would be if everything including Socail Security, Food stamps, unemployment unsurance were invalidated in possibly the same week in the House and Senate. This is the slippery slope we may now be headed down.

At that point there actually would be a real revolution. Even if at some point in the next 10 years the Republicans got 51 votes and voted Obamacare out of being likely the country's likely would never recover  financially from that after being on Obamacare for 10 years or more.

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