Tuesday, June 3, 2014

ISIS or ISIL? which is correct?

It appears both are correct. But I think more people are using ISIL than ISIS because ISIS is a historical Egyptian God during the time of the Pharoahs.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Wikipedia, the free ...

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant
Wikipedia
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Arabic: الدولة الاسلامية في العراق والشام‎ ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fi al-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām), abbreviated as ISIL or ISIS, is an ...
‎Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - ‎Fallujah - ‎Syrian opposition–Islamic ... - ‎Panter howitzer

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
الدولة الاسلامية في العراق والشام
Coat of arms
The extent of territory known to be influenced by the group.
The extent of territory known to be influenced by the group.
Status Unrecognized state
Capital Raqqa (Arabic: الرقة‎)
33°21′N 43°46′E
Official languages Arabic
Government Islamic State
 -  Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Separation from Iraq and Syria
 -  Proclaimed 15 October 2006[1] 
Time zone (UTC+3)
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
الدولة الاسلامية في العراق والشام  (Arabic)
ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fi al-'Iraq wa-sh-Sham
Participant in the Iraq War, the Global War on Terrorism, the Iraqi insurgency, and the Syrian Civil War
Flag of Islamic State of Iraq.svg
Flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Active 2003–present[2]
Ideology Pan-Islamism
Salafist Jihadism
Pro-Caliphate
Anti-Shia
Wahhabism
Leaders Abu Musab al-Zarqawi † (2004–2006)
Abu Ayyub al-Masri † (2006–2010)
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi † (2006–2010)
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (2010–present)
Headquarters Baqubah (Iraq)
Ar-Raqqah (Syria)
Area of
operations
  Iraq
 Syria
 Turkey[3][4][5][6]
 Lebanon[7][8]
Strength 5,000-6,000 (mostly in Syria)[9]
Part of al-Qaeda (2004[10]–2014[11])
Originated as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
al-Qaeda in Iraq
Mujahideen Shura Council
Khalf al-Mutayibeen
Islamic State of Iraq
Allies Harakat Sham al Islam
Suqour al-Ezz[12]
Opponents Syrian Armed Forces
Syria Free Syrian Army[13]
National Defense Force
Iraq Iraqi Armed Forces
People's Protection Units Flag.svg People's Protection Units (YPG)
Multi-National Force (2004-2009)
U.S. Forces – Iraq (2010-2011)
Awakening Councils
Shia militias
Turkey Turkish Armed Forces (border clashes)[14][15][16][17]
Hezbollah[citation needed]
Syria Syria Revolutionaries Front
Islamic Front
Al-Nusra Front[18]
Army of Mujahedeen
Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar[19]
Ansar al-Islam[20]
Jabhat al-Akrad[21]
Battles
and wars
 Iraq War
Iraqi Insurgency
Civil War in Iraq
Syrian Civil War[22]
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Arabic: الدولة الاسلامية في العراق والشام‎ ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fi al-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām), abbreviated as ISIL or ISIS, is an active group in Iraq and Syria.[23] It was established in the early years of the Iraq War, and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004, becoming known as "al-Qaeda in Iraq". The group was composed of and supported by a variety of insurgent groups, including its predecessor organisation, the Mujahideen Shura Council, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jaysh al-Fatiheen, Jund al-Sahaba, Katbiyan Ansar Al-Tawhid wal Sunnah, Jeish al-Taiifa al-Mansoura, etc., and other clans whose population profess Sunni Islam. It aimed to establish a caliphate in the Sunni majority regions of Iraq, later expanding this to include Syria. In February 2014, after an eight-month-long power struggle, al-Qaeda cut off all ties to ISIL.[24]
At the height of the Iraq War, it claimed a significant presence in the Iraqi provinces of Al Anbar, Ninawa, Kirkuk, and most of Salah ad Din, and parts of Babil, Diyala, and Baghdad. It claimed Baqubah as its capital.[25][26][27][28] In the ongoing Syrian Civil War, the group has a large presence in the Syrian governorates of Ar-Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo.[29][30]
In addition to attacks on government and military targets, the group has claimed responsibility for attacks that have killed thousands of Iraqi civilians.[31] Despite significant setbacks to the group during the latter stages of the American occupation of Iraq, by late 2012 the group was thought to have renewed its strength and more than doubled its number of members to about 2,500.[32]
A letter and later an audio recording by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, was leaked to Al Jazeera in 2013, disbanding the Syrian faction of the Islamic State.[33] However the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has made it clear that he differed with this ruling on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence,[34] and the group has since continued to operate in Syria. Starting in April 2013, the group made rapid military gains to control large parts of Northern Syria, where the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights described them as "the strongest group".[35]
Turkey has been blamed by the Western allies of the Syrian opposition for backing Al-Qaeda branches and off-shoots including ISIL and shipping weapons but Ankara has denied such allegations to date.[36][37]

Name and name changes

The group has used several different names since its formation in early 2004 as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (The Organization of Monotheism and Jihad). In October 2004, the group's then leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden, Zarqawi then changed the name of the group to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers (TQJBR), more commonly translated as al-Qaida in Iraq.[38][39] In January 2006 the group merged with several smaller Iraqi insurgent groups into an umbrella organizations called the Mujahideen Shura Council. On 12 October 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council joined with four other insurgent factions and representatives of a number of Iraqi tribes in a pact called Khalf al-Mutayibeen,[1] Oath of the Scented Ones,[40] which was followed the next day by the announcement of the establishment of the Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya or Islamic State of Iraq.[39][41] In April 2013, after the group expanded into Syria, it adopted the name the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL), also known as the "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham" (ISIS).[42] Although the organization has never used the name al-Qa`ida in Iraq to refer to itself, this has been frequently used to describe the group through it's various incarnations.[43]

Territorial Claims

On 13 October 2006, the group announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq, which claimed authority over Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Ninawa, and parts of Babel.[41] Following the 2013 expansion of the group into Syria and the anouncement of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the number of Vilayats (provinces) it claimed increased to 16. In addition to the 7 Iraqi wilayah, the Syrian divisions, largely along existing provincial boundaries, are Al Barakah, Al Kheir, Al Raqqah, Al Badiya, Halab, Idlib, Hama, Damascus and the Coast.[44]
In Syria, the ISIS' seat of power is in Ar-Raqqah Governorate. Top ISIS leaders, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, are known to have visited it's provincial capital, Raqqah.[45]

History

As Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad

Origins

Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, often abbreviated to "JTJ" or shortened to Tawhid and Jihad, Tawhid wal-Jihad and sometimes Tawhid al-Jihad (or just Al Tawhid or Tawhid), was started by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and a combination of foreigners and local Islamist sympathizers around 2000. Zarqawi was a Jordanian Salafi who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the Soviet-Afghan War, but he arrived after the departure of the Soviet troops and soon returned to his homeland. He eventually returned to Afghanistan, running an Islamic militant training camp near Herat. Originally, Zarqawi started the network with the intention of overthrowing the kingdom of Jordan, which he considered to be un-Islamic via the 4 schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, and for this purpose developed a large number of contacts and affiliates in several countries. Although unverified, his network may have been involved in the late 1999 plot to bomb the Millennium celebrations in the United States and Jordan. Zarqawi's operatives were also responsible for the assassination of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan in 2002.[46]
Following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi moved westward into Iraq, where he reportedly received medical treatment in Baghdad for an injured leg. It is believed that he developed extensive ties in Iraq with Ansar al-Islam ("Partisans of Islam"), a Kurdish Islamic militant group based in the extreme northeast of the country. Allegedly, Ansar had ties to Iraqi Intelligence; Saddam Hussein's motivation would have been to use Ansar as a surrogate force to repress the secular Kurds fighting for independence of Kurdistan.[47] In January 2003, Ansar's founder Mullah Krekar denied any connection with Saddam's government.[48] The consensus of intelligence officials has since concluded that there were no links whatsoever between Zarqawi and Saddam, and that Saddam viewed Ansar al-Islam "as a threat to the regime" and his intelligence officials were spying on the group. The Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq concluded in 2006, "Postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi."[49]
Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, JTJ developed into an expanding militant network including some of the remnants of Ansar al-Islam and a growing number of foreign fighters, with the purpose of resisting the coalition occupation forces and their Iraqi allies. Many foreign fighters arriving in Iraq were inititally not associated with the group, but once in the country they became dependent on Zarqawi's local contacts.[50] In May 2004, JTJ joined forces with an obscure Islamist militant group Salafiah al-Mujahidiah.[51]

Goals and tactics

The stated goals of JTJ were to force a withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq, to topple the Iraqi interim government, to assassinate collaborators with the occupation, to remove the Shia population and defeat its militias because of its death squad activities, and to subsequently establish a pure Islamic state.[52]
JTJ differed from the other early Iraqi insurgent groups considerably in its tactics. Rather than just using conventional weapons and guerrilla tactics in ambushes against the U.S. and coalition forces, it has relied heavily on suicide bombings, often using car bombs and targeting a wide variety of groups but especially Iraqi Security Forces and those facilitating the occupation. Groups of workers that have been targeted by JTJ include Iraqi interim officials, Iraqi Shia and Kurdish political and religious figures, the country's Shia Muslim civilians, foreign civilian contractors, and the United Nations and humanitarian workers.[50] Zarqawi's militants have been also known to use a wide variety of other tactics, including targeted kidnappings, the planting of improvised explosive devices, and mortar attacks; beginning in late June 2004, the JTJ implemented urban guerrilla-style attacks using rocket-propelled grenades and small arms. They also gained a worldwide notoriety for beheading Iraqi and foreign hostages and distributing video recordings of these acts on the Internet.

Activities


The U.N. headquarters building in Baghdad after the Canal Hotel bombing, on 22 August 2003
JTJ claimed credit for a number of attacks targeting Iraqi forces and infrastructure (including the October 2004 ambush and killing of 49 armed Iraqi National Guard recruits) and for a series of attacks on humanitarian aid agencies such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.[53] It also conducted numerous attacks against U.S. military personnel throughout 2004 and audacious suicide attacks inside the high-security Green Zone perimeter in Baghdad.[54] Zarqawi's men reputedly succeeded in assassinating several leading Iraqi politicians of the early post-Saddam era, and their bomb attack on the United Nations mission's headquarters in Iraq led the U.N. country team to relocate to Jordan and continue to work remotely.
The group either directly took responsibility or was blamed for many early Iraqi insurgent attacks, including the August 2003 series of high-profile bombings which killed 17 people at the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad;[50] 23 people, including the chief of the United Nations mission to Iraq Sérgio Vieira de Mello, at the UN headquarters in Baghdad;[50] and at least 86 including Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in the Imam Ali Mosque bombing in Najaf;[55] as well as the November truck bombing which killed 27 people, mostly Italian paramilitary policemen, at the Italian base in Nasiriyah.[50]
The 2004 attacks connected to the group included the series of bombings in Baghdad and Karbala which killed some 178 people during the holy Day of Ashura in March;[56] the April failed plot to explode chemical bombs in Amman, Jordan (said to be financed by Zarqawi's network);[57] a series of suicide boat bombings of the oil pumping stations in the Persian Gulf in April, for which Zarqawi took responsibility in a statement published by the Muntada al-Ansar Islamist web site; the May car bomb assassination of Iraqi Governing Council president Ezzedine Salim at the entrance to the Green Zone in Baghdad;[58] the June suicide car bombing in Baghdad which killed 35 civilians;[59] and the September car bomb which killed 47 police recruits and civilians on Haifa Street in Baghdad.[60]
Foreign civilian hostages abducted by the group in 2004 included American citizens Nick Berg, Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley, Turkish citizens Durmus Kumdereli, Aytullah Gezmen and Murat Yuce, South Korean citizen Kim Sun-il, Bulgarian citizens Georgi Lazov and Ivaylo Kepov, and a British citizen Kenneth Bigley. Most of them were beheaded using knives. Al-Zarqawi personally beheaded Berg and Armstrong, but Yuce was shot dead by al-Masri and Gezmen was released after "repenting".

As Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn

Goals and umbrella organizations

See also: Mujahideen Shura Council (Iraq)
In a July 2005 letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Zarqawi outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq War, which included expelling U.S. forces from Iraq, establishing an Islamic authority (caliphate), spreading the conflict to Iraq's secular neighbors, and engaging in the Arab–Israeli conflict.[61] The affiliated groups were linked to regional attacks outside Iraq consistent with their stated plan, such as the Sharm al-Sheikh bombings (2005) in Egypt which killed some 88 people, including many foreign tourists.
In January 2006, AQI created an umbrella organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), in an attempt to unify Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Its efforts to recruit Iraqi Sunni nationalists and secular groups were undermined by its violent tactics against civilians and its extreme Islamic fundamentalist doctrine.[62] Because of these impediments, the attempt was largely unsuccessful.[63]
AQI formerly attributed its attacks to the MSC until mid-October 2006, when Abu Ayyub al-Masri declared the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), another front which included the Shura Council factions. The AQI then began attributing its attacks in the name of the ISI.[64] According to a study compiled by U.S. intelligence agencies, the ISI have plans to seize power and turn the country into a Sunni Islamic state.[65]

As Islamic State of Iraq

Strength and activity

The group's strength is unknown, with estimates that ranged from just 850 to several thousand full-time fighters in 2007.[66][67] In 2006, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that AQI's core membership was "more than 1,000."[66] (These figures do not include the other six[68] AQI-led Salafi groups organized in the Islamic State of Iraq.) The group is said to be suffering high manpower losses (including from its many "martyrdom" operations), but for a long time this appeared to have little effect on its strength and capabilities, implying a constant flow of volunteers from Iraq and abroad. However, Al Qaeda in Iraq has more that doubled in strength, from 1,000 to 2,500 fighters, since the US withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011.[69]
In 2007 some observers and scholars suggested that the threat posed by AQI was being exaggerated and a "heavy focus on Al-Qaeda obscures a much more complicated situation on the ground."[70][71] According to both the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate and the Defense Intelligence Agency reports, AQI accounted for 15 percent of attacks in Iraq. However, the Congressional Research Service noted in its September 2007 report that attacks from al-Qaeda are less than two percent of the violence in Iraq and criticized the Bush administration's statistics, noting that its false reporting of insurgency attacks as AQI attacks has increased since the surge operations began in 2007.[66][72] In March 2007, the U.S.-sponsored Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyzed AQI attacks for that month and concluded the group had taken credit for 43 out of 439 attacks on Iraqi security forces and Shiite militias, and 17 out of 357 attacks on U.S. troops.[66]
According to the 2006 U.S. Government report, this group is most clearly associated with foreign Jihadi cells operating in Iraq and has specifically targeted international forces and Iraqi citizens; most of AQI's operatives were not Iraqi, but were coming through a series of safe houses, the largest of which was on the Iraq-Syrian border. AQI's operations are predominately Iraq-based, but the United States Department of State alleges that the group maintains an extensive logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia, and Europe.[61] In a June 2008 CNN special report, al-Qaeda in Iraq was called "a well-oiled organization (...) almost as pedantically bureaucratic as was Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party", collecting new execution videos long after they stopped publicising them, and having a network of spies even in the U.S. military bases. According to the report, Iraqis (many of them former members of Hussein's secret services) have now effectively run al-Qaeda in Iraq, with "foreign fighters' roles seem mostly relegated to the cannon fodder of suicide attacks"; however, the organization's top leadership was still dominated by non-Iraqis.[73]

Rise and decline of al-Qaeda in Iraq

The group officially pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network in a letter in October 2004.[74][75][76] That same month, the group, now popularly referred to as "Al-Qaeda in Iraq", kidnapped and murdered the Japanese citizen Shosei Koda. In November, al-Zarqawi's network was the main target of the U.S. Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, but its leadership managed to escape the American siege and subsequent storming of the city. In December, in two of its many sectarian attacks, al-Qaeda bombed a Shi'ite funeral procession in Najaf and the main bus station in nearby Karbala, killing at least 60 in the holy cities of Shia Islam. The group also reportedly took responsibility for the 30 September 2004 Baghdad bombing which killed 41 people, mostly children.[58]
In 2005, AQI largely focused on executing high-profile and coordinated suicide attacks, claiming responsibility for numerous attacks which were primarily aimed at Iraqi administrators. The group launched attacks against voters during the Iraqi legislative election in January, a combined suicide and conventional attack on the Abu Ghraib prison in April, and the coordinated suicide attacks outside the Sheraton Ishtar and Palestine Hotel in Baghdad in October.[61] In July, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and execution of Ihab Al-Sherif, Egypt's envoy to Iraq.[77][78] A July 2005 three-day series of suicide attacks, including the Musayyib marketplace bombing, left at least 150 people dead.[79] Al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility for the September single-day series of more than a dozen bombings in Baghdad, including a 14 September bomb attack, which killed about 160 people (mostly unemployed Shi'ite workers).[80] They claimed responsibility for series of mosque bombings which killed at least 74 people the same month in Khanaqin.[81]
The attacks blamed on or claimed by al-Qaeda in Iraq continued to increase in 2006 (see also the list of major resistance attacks in Iraq).[64] In one of the incidents, two U.S. soldiers (Thomas Lowell Tucker and Kristian Menchaca) were captured, tortured and beheaded by the ISI; in another, four Russian embassy officials were abducted and subsequently executed. Iraq's al-Qaeda and its umbrella groups were blamed for multiple attacks targeting the country's Shia population, some of which AQI claimed responsibility for. The U.S. claimed without verification that the group was at least one of the forces behind the wave of chlorine bombings in Iraq which affected hundreds of people (albeit with few fatalities) through the series of crude chemical warfare attacks between late 2006 and mid-2007.[82] During 2006, several key members of the AQI were killed or captured by American and allied forces; this included al-Zarqawi himself, killed on 7 June 2006, his spiritual adviser Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman, and the alleged "number two" deputy leader, Hamid Juma Faris Jouri al-Saeedi. The group's leadership was then assumed by the man called Abu Hamza al-Muhajir,[83] who was really the Egyptian militant Abu Ayyub al-Masri.[84]
The high-profile attacks linked to the group continued through early 2007, as the AQI-led Islamic State claimed responsibility for attacks such as the March assassination attempt on Sunni Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Salam al-Zaubai, the April Iraqi Parliament bombing, and the May capture and subsequent execution of three American soldiers. Also in May, ISI leader al-Baghdadi was declared to have been killed in Baghdad, but his death was later denied by the insurgents (later, al-Baghdadi was even declared by the U.S. to be non-existent). There were conflicting reports regarding the fate of al-Masri. From March to August, coalition forces fought the Battle of Baqubah as part of the largely successful attempts to wrest the Diyala Governorate from AQI-aligned forces. Through 2007, the majority of the suicide bombings targeting civilians in Iraq were routinely identified by the military and government sources as being the responsibility of al-Qaeda and its associated groups, even when there was no claim of responsibility (as was in the case of the 2007 Yazidi communities bombings, which killed some 800 people in the deadliest terrorist attack in Iraq to date).
By late 2007, violent and indiscriminate attacks directed by rogue AQI elements against Iraqi civilians had severely damaged their image and caused the loss of support among the population, isolating the group. In a major blow to AQI, many former Sunni militants that previously fought along with the group started to work with the American forces (see also below). The U.S. troop surge supplied the military with more manpower for operations targeting the group, resulting in dozens of high-level AQI members being captured or killed.[85] Al-Qaeda seemed to have lost its foothold in Iraq and appeared to be severely crippled.[86] Accordingly, the bounty issued for al-Masri was eventually cut from $5 million down to $100,000 in April 2008.[87]
As of 2008, a series of U.S. and Iraqi offensives managed to drive out the AQI-aligned insurgents from their former safe havens such as Diyala and Al Anbar Governorates and the embattled capital of Baghdad to the area of the northern city of Mosul, the latest of the Iraq War's major battlegrounds.[87] The struggle for control of Ninawa Governorate (the Ninawa campaign) was launched in January 2008 by U.S. and Iraqi forces as part of the large-scale Operation Phantom Phoenix aimed at combating Al-Qaeda activity in and around Mosul, as well as finishing off the network's remnants in central Iraq that escaped Operation Phantom Thunder in 2007. In 2008, Al-Qaeda bombed the Baghdad's pet market in February and a shopping centre in March, killing at least 98 and 68 people, respectively.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq has long raised money through various activities like kidnapping for ransom, car theft (sometimes killing drivers in the process), and hijacking fuel trucks, that would bring them tens of millions of dollars.[87] According to an April 2007 statement by their Islamic Army in Iraq rivals, AQI was demanding jizya tax and killing members of wealthy families when not being paid.[88] According to both U.S. and Iraqi sources in May 2008, the Islamic State of Iraq has been stepping up its fundraising campaigns as their strictly militant capabilities were on the wane, with especially lucrative activity said to be coming from oil operations centered on the industrial city of Bayji. According to U.S. military intelligence sources, in 2008 the group resembled a "Mafia-esque criminal gang".[87]

Resisting established sectarian violence through targeted attacks

Attacks against militiamen often targeted the Iraqi Shia majority in an attempt to incite sectarian violence.[89] Al-Zarqawi purportedly declared an all-out war on Shiites[80] while claiming responsibility for the Shiite mosque bombings.[81] The same month, a letter allegedly written by al-Zawahiri (later rejected as a "fake" by AQI) appeared to question the insurgents' tactic of indiscriminately attacking Shiites in Iraq.[90] In a December 2007 video, al-Zawahiri defended the Islamic State in Iraq, but distanced himself from the crimes against civilians committed by "hypocrites and traitors existing among the ranks".[91]
U.S. and Iraqi officials accused AQI of trying to slide Iraq into a full-scale civil war between Iraq's majority Shiites and minority Sunni Arabs with an orchestrated campaign of militiamen massacres and a number of provocative attacks against high-profile religious targets.[92] With purported attacks such as the 2003 Imam Ali Mosque bombing, the 2004 Day of Ashura and Karbala and Najaf bombings, the 2006 first al-Askari Mosque bombing in Samarra and the deadly single-day series of bombings in which at least 215 people were killed in Baghdad's Shiite district of Sadr City, and the second al-Askari bombing in 2007, they provoked Shiite militias to unleash a wave of retaliatory attacks, resulting in a plague of death squad-style killings and spiraling further sectarian violence which escalated in 2006 and brought Iraq to the brink of violent anarchy in 2007.[63] In 2008, sectarian bombings blamed on al-Qaeda killed at least 42 people at the Imam Husayn Shrine in Karbala in March and at least 51 people at a bus stop in Baghdad in June.

Operations outside Iraq and other activities

On 3 December 2004, AQI attempted to blow up an Iraqi–Jordanian border crossing, but failed to do so (in 2006, a Jordanian court sentenced Zarqawi in absentia and two of his associates to death for their involvement in the plot).[93] AQI increased its presence outside Iraq by claiming credit for three attacks in 2005. In the most deadly of such attacks, suicide bombs killed 60 people in Amman, Jordan, on 9 November 2005.[94] They claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks that narrowly missed the USS Kearsarge and the USS Ashland in Jordan, and which also targeted the city of Eilat in Israel, and also for the firing of several rockets into Israel from Lebanon in December.[61]
The Lebanese-Palestinian militant group Fatah al-Islam, which was defeated by Lebanese government forces during the 2007 Lebanon conflict, was linked to AQI and led by Zarqawi's former companion who had fought alongside him in Iraq.[95] The group may have been linked with the little-known group called "Tawhid and Jihad in Syria",[96] and may have influenced the Palestinian resistance group called "Tawhid and Jihad Brigades" (better known as Army of Islam) in Gaza.[97]
American officials believe that Al-Qaeda in Iraq has conducted bomb attacks against Syrian government forces.[98][99][100]
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that al-Qaeda in Iraq members have gone to Syria, where the militants previously received support and weapons.[101] The al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda inspired group, has claimed responsibility for attacks inside of Syria.[101]

Conflicts with the other groups

See also: Awakening movements in Iraq and Islamic Army-al-Qaeda conflict
The first reports of a split and even armed clashes between people and other Sunni groups date back to 2009.[102][103] In the summer of 2006, local Sunni tribes and insurgent groups, including the prominent Islamist-nationalist group Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), began to speak of their dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda and its tactics,[104] openly criticizing the foreign fighters for their deliberate targeting of Iraqi civilians. In September 2006, thirty Anbar tribes formed their own local alliance called the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC), directed specifically at countering al-Qaeda-allied terrorist forces in the province,[105][106] openly siding with the government and the U.S. troops.[107][108]
By the beginning of 2007, Sunni tribes and nationalist insurgents had begun battling with their former allies in AQI in order to retake control of their communities.[109] In early 2007, forces allied to Al-Qaeda in Iraq committed a series of attacks against Sunnis critical of the group, including the February 2007 attack in which scores of people were killed when a truck bomb exploded near a Sunni mosque in Fallujah.[110] Al-Qaeda supposedly played a role in the assassination of the leader of the Anbar-based insurgent group 1920 Revolution Brigade, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement.[111] In April 2007, the IAI spokesman accused the ISI of killing at least 30 members of the Islamic Army, as well as members of the Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna and Mujahideen Army insurgent groups, and called on Osama bin Laden to personally intervene to rein in Al-Qaeda in Iraq.[88][112] The following month, the government stated that AQI leader al-Masri was killed by ASC fighters.[84][92] Four days later, AQI released an audio tape in which a man claiming to be al-Masri warned Sunnis not to take part in the political process (later in May, the U.S. forces announced the release of dozens of Iraqis who were tortured by AQI as a part of the group's intimidation campaign,[113] but also said that reports of internal fighting between Sunni militia groups were "lies and fabrications".[114]
By June 2007, the growing hostility between foreign-influenced Jihadists and Sunni nationalists led to open gun battles between the groups in Baghdad.[115][116] The Islamic Army soon reached a ceasefire agreement with AQI, but refused to sign on to the ISI.[117] There were reports that Hamas of Iraq insurgents were involved in assisting U.S. troops in their Diyala Governorate operations against Al-Qaeda in August 2007. In September 2007, AQI claimed responsibility for the assassination of three people including the prominent Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, leader of the Anbar "Awakening council". That same month, a suicide attack on a mosque in the city of Baqubah killed 28 people, including members of Hamas of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigade, during a meeting at the mosque between tribal and guerilla leaders and the police.[118] Meanwhile, the U.S. military began arming moderate insurgent factions when they promised to fight Al-Qaeda in Iraq instead of the Americans.[119]
By December 2007, the strength of the "Awakening" movement irregulars (also called "Concerned Local Citizens" and "Sons of Iraq") was estimated at 65,000–80,000 fighters.[120] Many of them were former insurgents (including alienated former AQI supporters), now being armed and paid by the Americans specifically to combat al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq. As of July 2007, this highly controversial strategy proved to be effective in helping to secure the Sunni districts of Baghdad and the other hotspots of central Iraq and to rout out the al-Qaeda-aligned militants.

Transformation and attempted resurgency

In early 2009, U.S. forces began pulling out of cities across the country, turning over the task of maintaining security to the Iraqi Army, police, and their paramilitary allies. Experts and many Iraqis worried that in the absence of U.S. soldiers, AQI might resurface and attempt mass-casualty attacks to destabilize the country.[121] There was indeed a spike in the number of suicide attacks,[122] and through mid and late 2009, al-Qaeda in Iraq rebounded in strength and appeared to be launching a concerted effort to cripple the Iraqi government.[123] During August and October 2009, AQI asserted responsibility for four bombings targeting five government buildings in Baghdad, including attacks that killed 101 at the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance in August and 155 at the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works in September; these were the deadliest attacks directed at the new government in more than six years of war. These attacks represent a shift from the group's previous efforts to incite sectarian violence, although a series of suicide attacks in April targeted mostly Iranian Shia pilgrims, killing 76, and in June a mosque bombing in Taza killed at least 73 Shi'ites from the Turkmen ethnic minority.
According to the commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, AQI "has transformed significantly in the last two years. What once was dominated by foreign individuals has now become more and more dominated by Iraqi citizens." Odierno's comments reinforce accusations by the government of Nuri al-Maliki that al-Qaeda and ex-Ba'athists were working together to undermine improved security and sabotage the planned Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2010.[124] On 18 April 2010, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi were both killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid near Tikrit.[125] As of June 2010, 80% of the group's 42 leaders, including recruiters and fincanciers, have been killed or captured, with only eight remaining at large, according to Odierno. He said they were cut off from their leaders in Pakistan, and improved intelligence allowed for the successful mission in April that led to the killing of the two AQI top commanders; in addition, the number of attacks and casualty figures in the first five months of 2010 have been the lowest yet since 2003.[126][127][128] In May 2011, the Islamic State's "emir of Baghdad" Huthaifa al-Batawi, captured during the crackdown after the 2010 Baghdad church attack in which 68 people died, was killed during an attempted prison break after having killed an Iraqi general and several others.[129][130]
The group is currently led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was declared a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on 4 October 2011 by the US State Department with an announced reward of $10 million for information leading to his capture or death.[131] In August 2012, two Iraqi refugees who have resided in Kentucky were accused of assisting al-Qaeda in Iraq by sending funds and weapons; one has pleaded guilty.[132]

As Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

Declaration and dispute with al-Nusra

In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio statement, in which he announced that Jabhat al-Nusra had been established, financed and supported by the Islamic State of Iraq.[133] Al-Baghdadi declared that the two groups were officially merging under the name "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham."[134]
The leader of Jabhat Al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, issued a statement denying the merger and complaining that neither he nor anyone else in Al-Nusra's leadership had been consulted about it.[135] In June 2013 Al Jazeera reported that it had obtained a letter written by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, addressed to both leaders, in which he ruled against the merger and appointed an emissary to oversee relations between them and put an end to tensions.[136] In the same month, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio message rejecting Zawahiri's ruling and declaring the merger was going ahead.[34]
According to journalist Sarah Birke, there are "significant differences" between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL. While Al-Nusra actively calls for the overthrow of the Assad government, ISIL "tends to be more focused on establishing its own rule on conquered territory". The ISIL is "far more ruthless" in building an Islamic state, "carrying out sectarian attacks and imposing sharia law immediately". And while Nusra has a "large contingent of foreign fighters", it is seen as a home-grown group by many Syrians; by contrast, ISIL fighters have been described as "foreign occupiers" by many Syrian refugees.[137]
The Islamic State has reportedly "changed the course of the Syrian war" since its appearance in Syria by sending the Al Nusra Front (Islamic state's Syrian wing) in early 2012, which was an attempt to establish an Islamic state there.[137] It has a strong presence in mid and northern Syria, where it has instituted Sharia in a number of towns.[137] The group reportedly controlled the four border towns of Atmeh, al-Bab, Azaz, and Jarablus, allowing it to control entrance and exit from Syria into Turkey.[137] Other armed opposition groups have turned against the ISIL because the group considers itself a state "with its own courts", not "a faction among factions", not allowing other opposition groups to take benefits from smuggling weapons / drugs between Syria and Turkey, or to take penalties from Border-crossers. Some sources believe that the group is formed of 5,500 foreign fighters that is its backbone, as well as 2,000 Syrians from the northern part of the country and about 15,000 people, performing “secondary roles”. There is also a special unit, consisting of 250 militants. They are almost all foreigners (mostly immigrants from Russia’s North Caucasus), called the Jeish Mujakirin va Ansar (JMA), headed by an ethnic Chechen, Abu Umar Al-Shishani.[138]

Conflicts with the other groups

In Syria, rebels affiliated with the Islamic Front and the Free Syrian Army launched an offensive against ISIL militants in and around Aleppo in January 2014.[139][140]

Expansion in Iraq

During the clashes in Anbar in early 2014, ISIL militants took control of the city of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi.[141]

Timeline of Events

2003–2006 events

The group was founded in 2003 as a reaction to the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, and first led by the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network on 17 October 2004.[142] Foreign fighters from outside Iraq were thought to play a key role in its network.[143]
The group became a primary target of the Iraqi Government and its foreign supporters and attacks between these groups resulted in more than 1,000 deaths every year between 2004 and 2010.[10]
The ISI also made clear its belief that targeting civilians is an acceptable strategy and has been responsible for thousands of civilian deaths since 2004.[144] In September 2005 the group's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared war on Shia Muslims and the group has used bombings (especially suicide bombings in public places), massacres and executions to carry out terrorist attacks against Shia-dominated or mixed sectarian neighbourhoods.[145] However, ISI's suicide attacks also killed hundreds of Sunni civilians, which engendered widespread anger against the group by many Sunnis.

2007 events

Between late 2006 and May 2007, ISI brought the Dora neighborhood of southern Baghdad under its control. Numerous Christian families left, unwilling to pay the Jizya tax.[citation needed] US efforts to drive out the ISI presence stalled in late June 2007, despite the walling-off of streets and the use of biometric identification technology. By November 2007 the ISI had been removed from Dora, and Assyrian churches could be re-opened.[146] In 2007 alone the ISI killed around 2,000 civilians, making that year its most violent in its campaign against the civilian population of Iraq.[144]
On 9 March 2007, the Interior Ministry of Iraq said that Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was captured in Baghdad, but it was later said that the person in question was not Al-Baghdadi.[147][148]
On 19 April 2007, the organization announced that it had set up a provisional government termed "the first Islamic administration" of post-invasion Iraq. The "emirate" was stated to be headed by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and his "cabinet" of 10 "ministers":[149]
Name (English transliteration) and notable pseudonyms Arabic name Post Notes
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi
(Deceased 18 April 2010)
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Qurashi aka Abu Dua[150]		 أبو عمر البغدادي, أبو بكر البغدادي Emir Abu Dua, also known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,[151] is the second leader of the group.[151]
Abu Abdullah al-Hussaini al-Quraishi al-Baghdadi
Vice Emir
Abu Abdul Rahman al-Falahi أبو عبد الرحمن الفلاحي
ʾAbū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Falāḥī		 "First Minister" (Prime Minister)
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir aka Abu Ayyub al-Masri
(Deceased 18 April 2010)
Al-Nasser Lideen Allah Abu Suleiman aka Neaman Salman Mansour al Zaidi		 أبو حمزة المهاجر War Identity of al-Muhajir with al-Masri suspected. ISI only used former name. Abu Suleiman is the second minister of war.
Abu Uthman al-Tamimi أبو عثمان التميمي
ʾAbū ʿUṯmān at-Tamīmī		 Sharia affairs
Abu Bakr al-Jabouri
AKA Muharib Abdul-Latif al-Jabouri
(Deceased 1/2 May 2007)		 أبو بكر الجبوري
ʾAbū Bakr al-Ǧabūrī

AKA محارب عبد اللطيف الجبوري
Muḥārib ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Ǧabūrī		 Public Relations Common spelling variants: al-Jubouri, al-Jiburi.
Abu Abdul Jabar al-Janabi أبو عبد الجبار الجنابي Security
Abu Muhammad al-Mashadani أبو محمد المشهداني
ʾAbū Muḥammad al-Mašhadānī		 Information
Abu Abdul Qadir al-Eissawi أبو عبد القادر العيساوي
ʾAbū ʿAbd al-Qādir al-ʿĪsāwī		 Martyrs and Prisoners Affairs
Abu Ahmed al-Janabi أبو أحمد الجنابي
ʾAbū ʾAḥmad al-Ǧanābī		 Oil
Mustafa al-A'araji مصطفى الأعرجي
Muṣṭafā al-ʾAʿraǧī		 Agriculture and Fisheries
Abu Abdullah al-Zabadi أبو عبد الله الزيدي Health
Mohammed Khalil al-Badria محمد خليل البدرية
Muḥammad Ḫalīl al-Badriyyah		 Education Announced on 3 September 2007
These are all considered to be noms de guerre.
On 3 May, Iraqi sources claimed that Abu Omar al-Baghdadi had been killed a short time earlier; no evidence was provided to support his death, and US sources remained skeptical.[152] The Islamic State of Iraq released a statement later that day that denied his death.[153] The death of Abu Ayyub al-Masri was also claimed, apparently in error too (see that article for details).
In what was apparently the same incident,[verification needed] "Minister of Public Relations" Abu Bakr al-Jabouri was announced to have been killed on 12 May 2007 near Taji.[153] The exact circumstances of the incident remain unknown. The initial version of the events at Taji, as given by the Iraqi Interior Ministry, was a shootout between rival Sunni militias. Coalition and Iraqi government operations were apparently conducted in the same area about the same time, and later sources implied they were directly involved, with al-Jabouri being killed "resisting arrest (See Abu Omar al-Baghdadi for details and sources). The successor of al-Jabour (if any) is presently unknown.
In an ISI press release, responsibility was claimed for an ambush at Al Taqa, (Babil) on 12 May, at which one Iraqi soldier and 4 US 10th Mountain Division soldiers were killed; 3 soldiers of the US unit were captured. One was found dead in the Euphrates 11 days later. The other two were claimed to have been executed and buried in an ISI video release, after a 4,000-man manhunt by US and allied forces ended without success. No direct proof was given. Their bodies were found a year later.[154][155]
On 18 June, the US launched Operation Arrowhead Ripper, as "a large-scale effort to eliminate al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorists operating in Baquba and its surrounding areas".[156] See also Diyala province campaign.
The 25 June suicide bombing of a meeting of Al Anbar tribal leaders and officials at Mansour Hotel, Baghdad,[157] which killed 13, including 6 Sunni sheikhs[158] and some other prominent figures, was proclaimed by the ISI to have been in retaliation for the rape of a Sunni woman by Iraqi police.[159] Security at the hotel, which is some 100 meters outside the Green Zone, was provided by a British contractor[160] that apparently hired guerrilla fighters to provide physical security;[161] the veracity and implications of allegated claims of responsibility of an Egyptian Islamist group and possible on-scene assistance for the suicide bomber[162] are undetermined.
On July, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi released an audio tape that issued an ultimatum to Iran. He said: "We are giving the Persians, and especially the rulers of Iran, a two-month period to end all kinds of support for the Iraqi Shia government and to stop direct and indirect intervention ... otherwise a severe war is waiting for you." He further warned Arab states from doing business with Iran.[163]
Iran supports the Iraqi government which many see as anti-Sunni. Furthermore, Iran is believed to support Shi'ite militias, such as that of Muqtada al-Sadr, which have attacked Sunni groups and populations.
Resistance to Coalition operations in Baqubah turned out to be less than anticipated. In early July, US Army sources suggested that the ISI leadership as was in the area had largely relocated elsewhere in early June 2007, before start of Operation Arrowhead Ripper.[164]

2009-2012 events

The 25 October 2009 Baghdad bombings were attacks in Baghdad, Iraq which killed 155 people and injured at least 721 people.[165] The 8 December 2009 Baghdad bombings were attacks in Baghdad, Iraq which resulted in the deaths of at least 127 people and injured 448 more.[166] Both these attacks were claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq.
The Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for the 25 January 2010 Baghdad bombings attack that killed 41 people. The group claimed credit for the 4 April 2010 Baghdad bombings that killed 42 people and Injured 224. On 17 June 2010, the group claimed responsibility for an attack on Central Bank of Iraq that killed 18 people and 55 wounded.[167] On 19 August 2010, a statement posted on a website often used by Islamist radicals, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), a local al Qaeda umbrella group, claimed responsibility for the 17 August 2010 Baghdad bombings[168] and October 2010 bombings.[169]
According to the SITE Institute,[170] the Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for the 2010 Baghdad church attack that took place during a Sunday Mass on 31 October 2010.[171]
On 23 July 2012, about thirty-two attacks occurred across Iraq, killing 116 people and wounding 299. The Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks perpetrated in the form of bombings and shootings.[172]
A statement of support for Egyptian protesters, which appears to be the first reaction of any group affiliated with al Qaeda to the protests in Egypt as part of the 2011 Arab Spring Movement, was issued on jihadist forums on 8 February 2011, according to a U.S.-based group. The message, addressed to the protesters, says that the "market of jihad" had opened in Egypt and "the doors of martyrdom had opened," and every able-bodied man must participate. The group urged Egyptians to ignore the "ignorant deceiving ways" of secularism, democracy, and "rotten pagan nationalism." "Your jihad," the message said, is in support of Islam, the weak and oppressed in Egypt, for "your people" in Gaza and Iraq, and "for every Muslim who was touched by the oppression of the tyrant of Egypt and his masters in Washington and Tel Aviv," read a translation of the text provided by the SITE Intelligence Group.[173]

2013 events

FSA battalion chief Kamal Hamami—better known by his nom-de-guerre Abu Bassir Al-Jeblawi—was killed in July by the group's Coastal Region Emir after his convoy was stopped at an Islamic State checkpoint in Latakia's rural northern highlands. Al-Jeblawi was traveling to visit the Al-Izz Bin Abdulsalam Brigade operating in the region when group members refused his passage, resulting in an exchange of fire in which Al-Jeblawi received a fatal chest wound.
In 11 May 2013, two car bombs exploded in the town of Reyhanlı, Hatay Province, Turkey. At least 51 people were killed and 140 injured in the attack.[174] The attack was the deadliest single act of terrorism to occur on Turkish soil.[175][176] Along with Syrian intelligence services, also the ISIL was suspected for the bombing.
By 12 May 2013, nine Turkish citizens, alleged to have links to the Syrian intelligence agency, had been detained.[177] On 21 May 2013, the Turkish authorities charged the prime suspect, the state-run Anatolia news agency reported. Four other suspects were also charged. 12 people had been charged in total. All suspects were Turkish nationals that Ankara believes were backed by the Syrian government.[178]
From 30 September 2013, several Turkish media websites published that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the al-Qaeda splinter group operating in Iraq and Syria, accepted responsibility for the attack, threatening further attacks against Turkey.[3][4][5][179]
In July 2013, the group carried out a mass breakout of its imprisoned members held at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. It was reported that over 500 prisoners escaped, including senior commanders of the group.[180][181] The Islamic State issued an online statement claiming responsibility for the prison break, describing the operation as involving 12 car bombs, numerous suicide bombers and mortar and rockets fire.[180][181] It was described as the culmination of a one-year campaign called "Breaking the Walls", launched in 21 July 2012 by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and aiming to replenish the groups ranks by freeing their comrades.[182]
In early August 2013 ISIL led the final assault in the Siege of Menagh Air Base.[183]
In September 2013, members of the group kidnapped and killed the Ahrar ash-Sham commander Abu Obeida Al-Binnishi, after he had intervened to protect members of a Malaysian Islamic charity. The ISIL members had mistook their Malaysian flag for that of the United States.[184][185]
In September 2013 ISIL over-ran the Syrian town of Azaz, taking it from an FSA-affiliated rebel brigade.[186] ISIL members had attempted to kidnap a German doctor working in Azaz.[187] In November 2013 it was reported that Turkish authorities were on high alert, with the authorities saying they had detailed information on ISIL's plans to carry out suicide bombings in major cities in Turkey, using 7 explosive-laden cars being constructed in Raqqa.[188]
In November 2013, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) stated: "ISIL is the strongest group in Northern Syria −100%- and anyone who tells you anything else is lying.".[35]
In December 2013, there were reports of fighting between ISIL and another Islamic rebel group, Ahrar al Sham, in the town of Maskana, Aleppo.[189]

2014 events

On 3 January 2014, the ISIL proclaimed an Islamic state in Fallujah.[190]
On 4 January 2014, ISIL claimed responsibility for the 2 January car bomb attack that killed four people and wounded dozens in the southern Beirut suburb of Haret Hreik, a Hezbollah's bastion.[7][8]
On 25 January 2014, ISIL announced the creation of its new Lebanese arm, pledging to fight the Shia militant group Hezbollah and its supporters in Lebanon.[191]
On 30 January 2014, ISIL fired on border patrol soldiers in Turkey. In return, the Turkish Army retaliated with Panter howitzers and destroyed the ISIL convoy.[14][15][16]
On 20 March 2014, in Niğde city of Turkey, 3 Ethnic Albanian[192] members of ISIL[193] (Benjamin Xu, Çendrim Ramadani, Muhammed Zakiri) opened fire while hijacking a truck which killed one police and one gendarmerie officers and wounded five people.[194][195] Shortly after their arrest, Polis Özel Harekat teams launched a series in operations towards ISIL in İstanbul. Police found documents and a flag of ISIL in one place, 2 Azerbaijanis arrested[196]
On 27 April 2014, Iraqi military helicopters reportedly attacked and destroyed an ISIS convoy of 8 vehicles inside Syria. This may be the first time Iraqi forces have struck outside their country since the Gulf War.[197]

Notable members

Leaders
Other personnel

See also

References

  1. "The Rump Islamic Emirate of Iraq". Long War Journal. 16 October 2006. Retrieved 2 June 2014.
  2. "Al-Qaeda chief disbands main jihadist faction in Syria: Al-Jazeera", Hürriyet Daily News, 2013)
  3. "Reyhanlı saldırısını El Kaide üstlendi". Oda TV(BAD Source, no evidence provided). 1 October 2013.
  4. "Al-Qaeda Claims Responsibility for Reyhanlı". Aydınlık. 2 October 2013. Retrieved 21 January 2014.
  5. "ISIL threatens Erdoğan with suicide bombings in Ankara, İstanbul". Today's Zaman. 30 September 2013. Retrieved 21 January 2014.
  6. "Israeli general says Al-Qaeda's Syria fighters set up in Turkey". The Daily Star(BAD SOURCE, ISIS not part of AQ). 29 January 2014. Retrieved 30 January 2014.
  7. Mohammed Tawfeeq and Laura Smith-Spark (4 January 2014). "Islamist group ISIS claims deadly Lebanon blast, promises more violence". CNN. Retrieved 22 January 2014.
  8. "ISIS claims responsibility for Beirut car bomb". The Daily Star. 4 January 2014. Retrieved 22 January 2014.
  9. "Al Qaeda's Syrian Strategy". Foreign Policy. 10 October 2013. Retrieved 29 April 2014.
  10. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Iraq, Active dyads in this conflict (Prior names in parenthesis), Government of Iraq – ISI,http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=77&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#
  11. "Al-Qaeda disavows ISIS militants in Syria". BBC. 3 February 2014. Retrieved 3 February 2014.
  12. "Former Guantanamo detainee killed while leading jihadist group in Syria". Long War Journal. 4 April 2014. Retrieved 19 May 2014.
  13. "Al-Qaeda-linked Isis under attack in northern Syria". BBC. 4 January 2014. Retrieved 15 January 2014.
  14. "TSK, IŞİD konvoyunu vurdu". Milliyet. Retrieved 01.02.2014.
  15. "Türkiye IŞİD konvoyunu vurdu". dw.de. Retrieved 01.02.2014.
  16. "TSK, Irak-Şam İslam Devleti Örgütü konvoyunu vurdu". CNN TURK. Retrieved 01.02.2014.
  17. "Turkish army returns fire from al-Qaeda-affiliated fighters on Syrian border – Today's Zaman, your gateway to Turkish daily news". Today's Zaman. 16 October 2013. Retrieved 18 December 2013.
  18. "Syria: Al-Nusra Front agrees to end fighting with ISIS". Asharq Al-Awsat. 5 May 2014. Retrieved 21 May 2014.
  19. "Aleppo: Syria's Stalingrad?". National Interest. 22 April 2014. Retrieved 29 April 2014.
  20. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (11 May 2014). "Key Updates on Iraq’s Sunni Insurgent Groups". Brown Moses Blog. Retrieved 26 May 2014.
  21. "Syria rebels struggle for control over ISIL-held Raqqa". ARA News. 13 May 2014. Retrieved 16 May 2014.
  22. "Jihadists push Syria rebels out of Raqqa". Now.mmedia.me. Agence France-Presse. 14 August 2013. Retrieved 10 January 2014.
  23. "Profile: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)". JANUARY 7, 2014 (BBC). 6 January 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2014.
  24. Liz Sly (February 3, 2014). "Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq". The Washington Post. Retrieved February 7, 2014.
  25. "Situation Called Dire in West Iraq". The Washington Post, 2006-SEP-10.
  26. "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker". The Washington Post, 28 November 2006
  27. "Reporting under al-Qaida control". MSNBC. 27 December 2006. Retrieved 28 October 2009.
  28. Engel, Richard (17 January 2007). "Dangers of the Baghdad plan". MSNBC. Retrieved 28 October 2009.
  29. "Iraq jailbreak highlights al-Qaeda affiliate's ascendancy". The Washington Post. 23 July 2013.
  30. "Islamic law comes to rebel-held Syria". The Washington Post. 23 July 2013.
  31. "Al Qaeda tightens grip on western Iraq in bid for Islamic state". 11 December 2013. Retrieved 2 June 2014.
  32. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Iraq, In depth, Continued armed conflict after USA's troop withdrawal from Iraq, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=77&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#
  33. "Zawahiri disbands main Qaeda faction in Syria". 8 November 2013. Retrieved 8 November 2013.
  34. "Iraqi al-Qaeda chief rejects Zawahiri orders". Al Jazeera. 15 June 2013. Retrieved 15 June 2013.
  35. Gul Tuysuz, Raja Razek, Nick Paton Walsh (6 November 2013). "Al Qaeda-linked group strengthens hold in northern Syria". CNN. Retrieved 3 December 2013.
  36. "Les liaisons dangereuses de la Turquie avec certains rebelles extrémistes syriens". L'Orient – Le Jour. 21 October 2013. Retrieved 21 October 2013.
  37. "Turkey president urges shift in Syria policy". Yahoo News. 14 January 2014. Retrieved 14 January 2014.
  38. Craig Whitlock (June 10, 2006). "Death Could Shake Al-Qaeda In Iraq and Around the World". Washington Post.
  39. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Iraq, General One-sided violence Information, Actor information, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=77&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#, viewed on 18 June 2013
  40. "Islamist Websites Monitor No. 8". MEMRI. 17 October 2006. Retrieved 2 June 2014.
  41. "The Rump Islamic Emirate of Iraq". Long War Journal. 16 October 2006. Retrieved 2 June 2014.
  42. "Key Free Syria Army rebel 'killed by Islamist group'". BBC. 12 July 2013.
  43. "The ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor". CTC Sentinel. 29 May 2014. Retrieved 2 June 2014.
  44. "ISIS' 'Southern Division' praises foreign suicide bombers". Long War Journal. 9 April 2014. Retrieved 2 June 2014.
  45. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/04/isis-southern-division.php
  46. Richard Boucher (15 October 2004). "Foreign Terrorist Organization: Designation of Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad and Aliases". United States Department of State. Archived from the original on 11 July 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  47. "The Enemy of My Enemy: The odd link between Ansar al-Islam, Iraq and Iran" (PDF). The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Archived from the original on 30 June 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  48. Pam O'Toole (31 January 2003). "Mullah denies Iraq al-Qaeda link". BBC News. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  49. Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq, Conclusion 5
  50. Gary Gambill (16 December 2004). "Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi: A biographical sketch". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  51. "Profile: Tawhid and Jihad group". BBC News. 8 October 2004. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  52. Al-Qaeda leaders have proclaimed Iraq a major front in their global terrorist campaign. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 9 July 2005
  53. "Iraq: 2004 overview". MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Archived from the original on 27 August 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  54. "Country Reports on Terrorism". United States Department of State. 28 April 2006. Archived from the original on 11 July 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  55. Mohamad Bazzi (7 February 2005). "Zarqawi kin reportedly bombed shrine in Iraq". Newsday. Archived from the original on 1 October 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  56. Emily Hunt (15 November 2005). "Zarqawi's 'Total War' on Iraqi Shiites Exposes a Divide among Sunni Jihadists". Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Archived from the original on 4 July 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  57. Leiken, Robert; Brooke, Steven (18 May 2004). "Who Is Abu Zarqawi?". The Weekly Standard (CBS News). Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  58. "Fast facts about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi". Fox News Channel. Associated Press. 8 June 2006. Archived from the original on 29 June 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  59. "Car bomb kills 35 in Baghdad". CNN. 18 June 2004. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  60. Peter Cave (14 September 2004). "Car bomb kills dozens in Baghdad". ABC News. Archived from the original on 30 December 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  61. "Foreign Terrorist Organizations", Country Reports on Terrorism, U.S. State Department, 28 April 2006
  62. Muir, Jim (11 June 2007). "US pits Iraqi Sunnis against al-Qaeda". BBC News.
  63. DeYoung, Karen; Pincus, Walter (18 March 2007). "Al-Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here". The Washington Times.
  64. "al jehad in Iraq (AQI)", Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School
  65. Mahnaimi, Uzi (13 May 2007). "Al-Qaeda planning militant Islamic state within Iraq". The Times (London). Archived from the original on 24 May 2011.
  66. Tilghman, Andrew. "The Myth of AQI". Washington Monthly.
  67. Parker, Ned (15 July 2007). "Saudis' role in Iraq insurgency outlined". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 1 September 2007.
  68. "Two leaders linked to al-Qaeda group arrested". Adnkronos. 7 April 2003. Retrieved 20 April 2012.
  69. Roggio, Bill (6 November 2012). "Al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bomber kills 31 at Iraqi Army base in Taji". Long War Journal.
  70. Yacoub, Sameer (8 June 2007). "In motley array of Iraqi foes, why does U.S. spotlight al-Qaida?". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008.
  71. Hoyt, Clark (8 July 2007). "Seeing Al Qaeda Around Every Corner". The New York Times.
  72. CRS Report To Congress: Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security Congressional Research Service PDF 6 September 2007
  73. Ware, Michael (11 June 2008). "Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq". CNN.
  74. "Zarqawi pledges allegiance to Osama". Dawn. Agence France-Presse. 18 October 2004. Archived from the original on 29 December 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  75. "Al-Zarqawi group vows allegiance to bin Laden". MSNBC. Associated Press. 18 October 2004. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  76. Jeffrey Pool (18 October 2004). "ZARQAWI'S PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAEDA: FROM MU'ASKER AL-BATTAR, ISSUE 21". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  77. "Al-Qaeda claims to have killed Egyptian envoy". The New York Times. 7 July 2005.
  78. Caroll, Rory; Borger, Julian (8 July 2005). "Egyptian envoy to Iraq killed, says al-Qaida". The Guardian (London).
  79. Howard, Michael (18 July 2005). "Three days of suicide bombs leave 150 dead". The Guardian (London).
  80. "Another wave of bombings hit Iraq". The New York Times. 15 September 2005.
  81. Tavernise, Sabrina (17 September 2005). "20 die as insurgents in Iraq target Shiites". The New York Times.
  82. "U.S. says Iraq chlorine bomb factory was al Qaeda's". Reuters. 24 February 2007.
  83. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq names new head". BBC News. 12 June 2006.
  84. Tran, Mark (1 May 2007). "Al-Qaida in Iraq leader believed dead". The Guardian (London).
  85. Targeting al Qaeda in Iraq's Network, The Weekly Standard, 13 November 2007
  86. Ricks, Thomas; DeYoung, Karen (15 October 2007). "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Reported Crippled". The Washington Post.
  87. Samuels, Lennox (20 May 2008). "Al Qaeda Nostra". Newsweek.
  88. Andoni, Lamis. "On whose side is Al-Qaeda?". Al-Ahram.
  89. Atwan, Abdel Bari (20 March 2006). "Al Qaeda's hand in tipping Iraq toward civil war". The Christian Science Monitor.
  90. "Al-Qaeda disowns 'fake letter'". BBC News. 13 October 2005.
  91. "British 'fleeing' claims al-Qaeda". Adnkronos. 7 April 2003. Retrieved 20 April 2012.
  92. "Al Qaeda leader in Iraq 'killed by insurgents'". ABC News. 1 May 2007.
  93. Aloul, Sahar (19 December 2005). "Zarqawi handed second death penalty in Jordan". The Inquirer. Agence France-Presse. Archived from the original on 29 October 2007.
  94. "Al Qaeda claims responsibility for Amman blasts". The New York Times. 10 November 2005.
  95. "Fatah Islam: Obscure group emerges as Lebanon's newest security threat". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 20 May 2007. Archived from the original on 25 May 2007.
  96. "Al-Qaida inspired militant group calls on Syrians to kill country's president". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 28 May 2007. Archived from the original on 2 July 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  97. "Palestine: Reporter is dead, claims terror group". The Straits Times (Asia Media). 17 April 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  98. Jonathan S. Landay (10 February 2012). "U.S. officials: Al Qaida behind Syria bombings". McClatchy. Retrieved 20 April 2012.
  99. Jonathan S. Landay (16 February 2012). "Top U.S. intelligence officials confirm al Qaida role in Syria". McClatchy. Retrieved 20 April 2012.
  100. "Al-Qaeda probably responsible Syrian suicide bombings, US spy chief claims". The Daily Telegraph (London). 17 February 2012.
  101. Karam, Zeina (7 June 2012). "Iraq: Al-Qaeda migrates to Syria". Associated Press.
  102. Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith (27 October 2005). "'We don't need al-Qaida'". The Guardian (London).
  103. Caroll, Rory; Mansour, Osama (7 September 2005). "Al-Qaida in Iraq seizes border town as it mobilises against poll". The Guardian (London).
  104. "Rebels call on Al Qaida to 'review' behaviour". Gulf News. Reuters. 7 April 2007. Archived from the original on 28 June 2007.
  105. Klein, Joe (23 May 2007). "Is al-Qaeda on the Run in Iraq?". Time (Time Inc.).
  106. Beaumont, Peter (3 October 2006). "Iraqi tribes launch battle to drive al-Qaida out of troubled province". The Guardian (London).
  107. ABC7 News, KGO-TV, San Francisco/Oakland/San Jose[dead link]
  108. Burns, John; Rubin, Alissa (11 June 2007). "U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies". The New York Times.
  109. Crain, Charles (1 January 2008). "Exit Al-Qaeda. Enter the Militias?". Time.
  110. "Iraqis killed by chlorine bombs". BBC News. 17 March 2007. Archived from the original on 20 December 2010.
  111. "Official Blames Al Qaeda in Iraq for Death of Key Sunni Insurgent Leader". Fox News Channel. Associated Press. 27 March 2007.
  112. "Al-Qaida linked group moves to patch up rift among insurgent factions". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 17 April 2007. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008.
  113. "U.S. frees 42 al Qaeda kidnap victims in Iraq". CNN. 27 May 2007.
  114. "Tape from 'dead' Al Masri put on Web". Gulf News. 5 May 2007.
  115. "Bombed bridge, Turkish troops trouble Kurdish Iraq from two sides". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 1 June 2007. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008.
  116. Hurst, Steven R. "Sunnis Revolt Against al-Qaida in Iraq", The Guardian, 1 June 2007[dead link]
  117. Ghosh, Bobby (6 June 2007). "A Truce Between U.S. Enemies in Iraq". Time.
  118. "Leader of 'Hamas of Iraq' and 1920 Brigades dead in mosque attack". Adnkronos. 25 September 2007.
  119. MacAskill, Ewen (12 June 2007). "US arms Sunni dissidents in risky bid to contain al-Qaida fighters in Iraq". The Guardian (London).
  120. Rubin, Alissa J.; Damien Cave (23 December 2007). "In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict". The New York Times. Retrieved 26 December 2007.
  121. Peter, Tom (13 January 2009). "As US withdraws, will Al Qaeda in Iraq find new openings?". The Christian Science Monitor.
  122. Arraf, Jane (13 May 2009). "Spike in suicide attacks: Is Al Qaeda in Iraq coming back?". The Christian Science Monitor.
  123. Londoño, Ernesto (22 November 2009). "Resurgent al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to undermine government". The Washington Post.
  124. Christie, Michael (18 November 2009). "Al Qaeda in Iraq becoming less foreign-U.S. general". Reuters.
  125. Arango, Tim (19 April 2010). "Top Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Reported Killed in Raid". The New York Times.
  126. Shanker, Thom (4 June 2010). "Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Neutralized, U.S. Says". The New York Times.
  127. "US says 80% of al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq removed". BBC News. 4 June 2010.
  128. "Attacks in Iraq down, Al-Qaeda arrests up: US general". Google News. Agence France-Presse. 4 June 2010.
  129. "Al-Qaeda leader attempts Baghdad jailbreak leaving 18 dead". The Daily Telegraph (London). 8 May 2011. Retrieved 10 May 2011.
  130. Mohammed, Muhanad (8 May 2011). "Al Qaeda leader and 17 others killed in Iraq jail clash". Reuters. Retrieved 10 May 2011.
  131. "Terrorist Designation of Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri". United States Department of State. 4 October 2011. Retrieved 8 October 2011.
  132. Brett Barrouquere (16 August 2012). "Iraqis in Ky. linked to IED attack zone". Army Times. Associated Press. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
  133. "Qaeda in Iraq confirms Syria's Nusra is part of network". Agence France-Presse. 9 April 2013. Retrieved 9 April 2013.
  134. "ISI Confirms That Jabhat Al-Nusra Is Its Extension in Syria, Declares 'Islamic State of Iraq And Al-Sham' As New Name of Merged Group". Memri. 8 April 2013. Retrieved 10 April 2013.
  135. "Al-Nusra Commits to al-Qaeda, Deny Iraq Branch 'Merger'". Agence France-Presse. 10 April 2013. Retrieved 18 May 2013.
  136. "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger". Al Jazeera. 9 June 2013. Retrieved 10 June 2013.
  137. Birke, Sarah (27 December 2013). "How al-Qaeda Changed the Syrian War". New York Review of Books.
  138. http://journal-neo.org/2014/01/18/rus-rost-mezhdunarodno-terroristicheskoj-ugrozy-s-territorii-sirii/
  139. Saad, Hwaida; Gladstone, Rick (3 January 2014). "Qaeda-Linked Insurgents Clash With Other Rebels in Syria, as Schism Grows". New York Times. Retrieved 16 January 2014.
  140. Casey, Mary Joshua Haber; Joshua Haber. "Rebel factions continue fight against ISIL in Northern Syria". JANUARY 7, 2014. FP (Foreign Policy). Retrieved 7 January 2014.
  141. Michaels, Jim (4 January 2014). "Al-Qaeda militants in Iraq seize much of Fallujah: The fighting is the worst violence since U.S. forces left Iraq at the end of 2011". USA Today.
  142. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Iraq, In Depth, 2004–2009 the Al-Qaida ally ISI and its predecessors TQJBR and MSC, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=77&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#, viewed on 18 June 2013
  143. Peter Grier, Faye Bowers (14 May 2004). "Iraq's bin Laden? Zarqawi's rise". The Christian Science Monitor. Archived from the original on 8 June 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
  144. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Iraq, General One-sided violence Information, Information by year, ISI – civilians, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=77&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#, viewed on 18 June 2013
  145. Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Iraq, General One-sided violence Information, Actor information, Summary, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=77&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#, viewed on 18 June 2013
  146. Ned Parker: "Christians forced out of Baghdad district". Los Angeles Times, 27 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  147. "Captured Iraqi not al-Baghdadi".[dead link] Al Jazeera 10 February 2007.
  148. "Iraqi ministry: Militant leader arrested in Baghdad".[dead link] CNN, 9 March 2007.
  149. "Islamic State of Iraq Announces Establishment of the Cabinet of its First Islamic Administration in Video Issued Through al-Furqan Foundation". SITE Institute, 19 April 2007. Retrieved 2007-04-20.
  150. "Most wanted names of terror world". Hindustan Times. 3 April 2012. Retrieved 12 September 2013.
  151. "Wanted: Abu Du'a; Up to $10 Million". Rewards for Justice. Retrieved 2 June 2012.
  152. "Iraq says insurgent leader dead". CNN, 3 May 2007.
  153. "Islamic State of Iraq Denies the Killing of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, but Confirms the Death of its Official Spokesman, Abu Abdullah al-Jabouri". SITE Institute, 3 May 2007.
  154. Marquez, Jeremiah (24 May 2007). "SoCal family mourns soldier found dead in Iraq river". U-T San Diego. Associated Press. Retrieved 16 November 2013.
  155. Michael Zitz: "With men still missing, a soldier returns to Iraq".[dead link] Free Lance-Star, 27 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  156. "US launches major Iraq offensive". BBC.co.uk, 19 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  157. Charles J. Hanley: "Suicide bomber kills 13 at busy Baghdad hotel"., The Washington Times, Associated Press, 26 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  158. "Police Release Tribal Shaykhs' Names". IraqSlogger, 27 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  159. "Al-Qaida linked to Baghdad hotel bombing". The Guardian, 26 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  160. "Brit Security Firm Faulted in Hotel Bombing". IraqSlogger, 27 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  161. "Al Mansour Hotel, Baghdad". Yahoo! Travel, 5 February 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  162. Mike Drummond: "Two tribal leaders killed in Baghdad".[dead link] The Miami Herald, McClatchy News Service, 27 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-27.
  163. "Al-Qaeda Issues Ultimatum to Iran" Cafe Cordover by Adam Cordover
  164. "More death and political intrigue" Nermeen Al-Mufti, Al-Ahram Weekly, 5–11 July 2007
  165. "Baghdad bomb fatalities pass 150". BBC News. 26 October 2009. Retrieved 26 October 2009.
  166. "Baghdad car bombs cause carnage". BBC News. 8 December 2009. Retrieved 8 December 2009.
  167. "AFP: Qaeda in Iraq claims deadly central bank raid". Agence France-Presse. 17 June 2010. Retrieved 12 September 2013.
  168. al-Ansary, Khalid (20 August 2010). "Al Qaeda claims responsibility for attack in Iraq". Reuters.
  169. "Dead Iraqi soldiers". LiveLeak.com. 31 October 2010. Retrieved 12 September 2013.
  170. "Hostages Killed in Al-Qaeda Attack on Baghdad Church". Al-Manar. Agence France-Presse. 1 November 2010. Retrieved 6 November 2010.
  171. "Al-Qaeda claims Iraq church attack". Al Jazeera. 2 November 2010. Retrieved 6 November 2010.
  172. Nordland, Rod (25 July 2012). "Al Qaeda Taking Deadly New Role in Syria Conflict". The New York Times. Retrieved 25 July 2012.
  173. "Al Qaeda in Iraq calls Egypt protesters to wage jihad". Dawn. Agence France-Presse. 9 February 2011. Retrieved 16 November 2013.
  174. "Death toll rises to 42 as explosions hit Turkish town on border with Syria". Hürriyet Daily News. 11 May 2013. Retrieved 11 May 2013.
  175. "Deadliest Terror Attack in Turkey's History Might Be Another Attempt to Derail Peace Talks? But Which One? Syria or PKK?". The Istanbulian. 11 May 2013. Retrieved 11 May 2013.
  176. "Turkey Blames Syria's Assad for Its Deadliest Terror Attack". Bloomberg News. 11 May 2013. Retrieved 11 May 2013.
  177. USA Today, 12 May 2013
  178. AFP, 21 May 2013
  179. ""El Kaide, Reyhanlı'yı üstlendi" iddiası". CNN Türk. 1 October 2013.
  180. "Iraq:hundreds escape from Abu Ghraib jail". The Guardian (London). 22 July 2013. Retrieved 24 July 2013.
  181. "Abu Ghraib Prison Break:Al Qaeda in Iraq Claims Responsibility for Raid". Huffington Post. 23 July 2013. Retrieved 24 July 2013.
  182. "Al Qaeda in Iraq Abu Ghraib Jailbreak a Counterterrorism Nightmare". The Daily Beast. 29 July 2013. Retrieved 1 August 2013.
  183. Wall Street Journal, 6 August 2013, Capture of Syrian Air Base Shows al Qaeda's Increasing Sway
  184. "Message from Ayman al-Zawahiri". Now Lebanon. 11 November 2013. Retrieved 22 January 2014.
  185. "Will I die today? Face to face with jihadists fuelled by hate". The Australian. 14 September 2013. Retrieved 22 January 2014.
  186. Reuters, 19 September 2013, Syrian rebels, Qaeda group clash near Turkish border crossing
  187. Hurriyet Daily News, 19 September 2013, Al-Qaeda group and FSA declare truce as Turkey keeps Syria border gate closed
  188. Today's Zaman, 4 November 2013, Syrian al Qaeda prepares to launch attack in Turkey's big cities
  189. By BARBARA SURK (10 December 2013). "Syrian army pounds rebels near Lebanon border – Yahoo News". Yahoo! News. Retrieved 18 December 2013.
  190. "Iraqi City in Hands of Al-Qaida-Linked Militants". Voice of America. 4 January 2014. Retrieved 16 January 2014.
  191. "Al-Qaeda-linked groups expand into Lebanon". Al Jazeera. 26 January 2014. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
  192. http://www.dha.com.tr/nigde-zanlilari-tutuklandi-_631606.html
  193. http://www.gercekgundem.com/guncel/32711/nigde-saldirisini-el-kaide-duzenledi
  194. http://www.dha.com.tr/jandarma-timlerine-saldiri-2-sehit_627792.html
  195. http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/editorunsectikleri/142852.aspx
  196. http://www.dha.com.tr/en-son-haber-nigdedeki-saldiriyla-ilgili-istanbulda-2-kisi-yakalandi-son-dakika-haberleri_632624.html
  197. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27179916
This page was last modified on 3 June 2014 at 10:09.
end quote from:

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Wikipedia, the free ...

To show you just how confusing all this is for everyone, the U.S. was an ally of them from 2010 to 2011 in Iraq during the very end of the Iraq War there. 

It is important to know that Al Qaeda and ISIL (also ISIS) are all funded by drugs and human trafficking and always have been. But, like most criminal organizations around the world they are branching out into oil wells, trucking and hauling oil and likely refining oil somehow as well in northern Syria.

American Helicopter pilots allied with the Iraq Government just blew up (within the last month or so) a convoy of oil they brought into Iraq to fight the Iraq Government with.

Posted by at
Labels:

No comments:

Post a Comment

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)