Monday, April 7, 2014

Denial of Reality or Sphere of Influence?

Though people might call Obama's behavior "Denial of Reality" in regard to Ukraine a better explanation is in Cold War Terms which is "Sphere of Influence". The way the U.S. and the Soviet Union(former Russia) kept from nuking the whole world out of existence was and is "Sphere of influence". Sphere of influence is why the Soviet Union didn't get involved in the Viet Nam War (sort of). Sphere of influence is why Russia didn't get involved when we invaded Iraq after 2001 or Afghanistan after 2001 "Sphere of influence". Also, this is one reason why Russia didn't get that involved when Nato and the U.S. helped liberate Libya. It is also why the U.S. hasn't gotten very involved in Syria "Sphere of influence" because Syria and Iran have always been in Russia's pocket and before that the Soviet Union had them in their pocket "Sphere of influence". So, I think it's younger folks that don't understand this battle strategy to avoid the end of life on earth and of earth itself that make statements like "Denial of Reality" in regard to a U.S. president. Because he doesn't want to end up nuking the whole world out of existence by accident "Sphere of influence" is one way to prevent that from happening. However, we will also see what the future brings in reality. This author speaks to the issue of sphere of influence which many younger people might not know about or understand from the old days of the Cold War 1945 to around 1990.

Denial of reality

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A Familiar Script in Ukraine
Dr Maleeha Lodhi Tuesday, April 08, 2014
From Print Edition
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The crisis over Ukraine has provided a fresh opportunity to President Barack Obama’s domestic detractors to assail him for ‘failing to lead’ and to deploy American power to force the Russian president to retreat. Much of this criticism shows wilful ignorance of the limits of US power in a transformed international environment where no single state is able achieve outcomes by itself or prevail over others, even by using overwhelming hard power.

There are several aspects to the criticism being directed at Obama’s ‘failure to act’ by an odd assortment of conservative and liberal commentators in America. First, there is the moral tone of their response to Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea. This moral indignation is being voiced by the same people who unquestioningly supported the US invasion of Iraq. But the irony seems lost on them.

These critics are not alone in adopting a posture of moral righteousness. Many Western leaders have, in varying degrees, struck the same note in their reaction to Putin’s move. US Secretary of State John Kerry, for example, declared (addressing the Russian leadership) “you just don’t behave in 19th century fashion, by invading another country on a completely trumped-up pretext”. More than irony, this stance provided an example of Western doublespeak, coming from the foreign minister of the country that carried out an illegal military intervention in Iraq on the grounds of non-existent weapons of mass destruction.

Some conservative American commentators drew unflattering comparisons between the Obama administration and Jimmy Carter’s presidency. A columnist in the conservative Wall Street Journal wrote that, like Carter, Obama’s “weakness” had earned America scorn from its foes and ostensible friends. In an editorial titled ‘Obama’s uncertain trumpet’ the Journal accused Obama of failing to lead and lacking a robust strategy on Ukraine. It critiqued him for “settling for minor sanctions, rhetorical pleading and diplomatic admonitions”, but did not offer any alternative.

The neoconservative American magazine, Weekly Standard, went further. Its editorial railed about the lack of “resolve and strength” in Obama’s foreign policy, and accused him of not believing in “an international system in which the American role is to lead”. It said the message Obama was sending to the world is this: “Superpower once lived here. No forwarding address”. And it concluded “America can’t be strong with a president committed to weakness”.

Joining the conservative lament about America’s loss of global clout was Mitt Romney, who unsuccessfully challenged Obama in the 2012 presidential election. He accused Obama of failing to act “in time” and of “negligence” in international affairs that had left the US with “no good options” from “Crimea to North Korea, from Syria to Egypt, and from Iraq to Afghanistan”.

But if this criticism only implied that the US should have threatened military action or engaged in muscle flexing, other commentators were more explicit. Writing in Foreign Policy, Leslie Gelb took issue with Obama on his ruling out force over Ukraine. “Diplomatic and economic slaps are not enough” to deter Putin from further encroachment into Ukraine or as a signal to warn other aggressors, he argued. Diplomacy is no use if it is not backed by the option of military force.

Gelb advocated a strong “military dimension” to US strategy and proposed deploying Patriot missiles, mobilising more air power, and ‘preparing” Ukrainians for guerrilla war against an invading Russian force. Other critics even went so far as to suggest that Obama’s refusal to bomb Syria had emboldened America’s adversaries and encouraged Putin to take over Crimea.

Suggestions to project or employ military power seemed astonishing and disingenuous after a decade of hyper intervention by the US and two long and disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military overreach not only damaged America’s standing and reputation but also made the subsequent use of force much harder as these military engagements were widely seen to have failed to achieve their goals and therefore met with strong public disapproval at home.

Overlooking this experience, and that of the more limited engagement in Libya, and urging more military intervention meant turning a blind eye to the limits of military power. Advising this course of action also placed these critics at odds with the overwhelming sentiment among war-fatigued Western publics, wary of more overseas military engagements.

Those ascribing the erosion of US global influence simply to Obama’s lack of leadership seemed to miss a fundamental point – that the world has changed in very significant ways with America’s unipolar moment having long passed into history. The redistribution of global power has been one of the most consequential developments of this century. Some have characterised this as a G-Zero world, in which no nation on its own or with others can deploy enough power to secure global outcomes or determine the rules of the game.

The dispersal of power and shift in global power from the West to the Rest has resulted in a more complex international landscape. In this new setting no country is able to call the shots or impose its will on its own. Although the US remains the world’s dominant power, it is also constrained by an increasingly decentralised international system and the emergence of multipolarity. As Obama recognises, this means the US has to work with other nations and build coalitions to promote its goals.

To ignore this is to fly from reality. Commentators urging Obama to act in a more muscular fashion seem to be living in denial about the complex dynamics shaping the world today. When these writers complain that “it isn’t like it used to be”, they are right. But that doesn’t lead them to the next logical stage – acknowledging that the era of America’s global hegemony is over.

Some of these commentators have also criticised America’s European partners for being “weak” even “passive” by failing to support tougher action against Russia. This again shows lack of understanding about the dynamics of economic interdependence. As key European nations are dependent on Russian energy or economically vulnerable in other ways, they can hardly be expected to disregard their interests and inflict pain on themselves. These European nations have had to balance economic considerations with the need to preserve the unity of the Western alliance in the face of the Russian action.

Finally, nowhere in this commentary is there any attempt to understand the role Western conduct may itself have played in Putin’s action to reunify Crimea with Russia. The West’s hubristic handling of Russia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, reflected the lack of willingness to accommodate Moscow’s legitimate security interests. Instead Nato’s eastward expansion towards Russia’s borders and US insistence on pursuing plans for a missile shield in Europe meant riding roughshod over Russian concerns. This reinforced Russia’s fear of being encircled.

This may not justify the Russian move on Crimea but it underlines how in these complex situations, a black and white view and moral pontification doesn’t help to explain reality or delineate a path to resolving the problem.

Critics who have been arguing that President Obama’s “weak” conduct is shaping the world’s view of American power have in fact got it backwards. It is the limits on American power imposed by a transformed world that is shaping Obama’s conduct – as well as urging other Western nations to take a cautious approach, relying on diplomacy to avert a bigger crisis over Ukraine.

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.

Twitter: @LodhiMaleeha
end quote from:

Denial of reality

The Soviet Union looked the other way when the Viet Nam War was going on. Russia looked the other way when

Yugoslav Wars - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslav_Wars
Wikipedia
"Third Balkan War": a term suggested by British journalist Misha Glenny in the title of ... By the early 1990s, there was no effective authority at the federal level.

Bosnian War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnian_War
Wikipedia
The Bosnian War was an international armed conflict that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1 March (formalized 6 April) 1992 and 14 December ...
took place. "Sphere of influence". Russia looked the other way during the Iraq war and the Afghanistan War. The U.S. "sort of" looked the other way during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s (except for the CIA giving Osama bin Laden and the Mujahedeen missiles to shoot down Soviet Helicopters and planes (See the movie: Charlie Wilson's War).
Now, Russia is expecting (to some degree) Nato and the U.S. from getting involved in this "Sphere of influence". So, there will be no Nato operations against the Russians taking over towns in Ukraine. However, in some ways Russia is sort of breaking some of the basic rules of "Sphere of influence" but then again Russia might feel we owe them for spending so much time in Iraq and Afghanistan since around 2002 or 2003.
However, can the U.S. and Nato just sit around while Russia takes Ukraine city by city? I think not so more biting Sanctions likely are going to be put in place over time. However, the next level of sanctions are not only going to hurt Russia they are going to economically hurt Europe and the U.S. This is why the U.S. and Europe would rather not go to the next level.

However, the U.S. might be giving Anti-Tank Weapons to Syrian Rebels now I have also read about the U.S. giving shoulder fired missiles to Syrian Rebels to shoot down helicopters and planes so they don't lose this war. So, it is possible that the Syrian situation is turning now to a little bit like The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan where the CIA gave shoulder fired missiles to Osama Bin Laden and the Mujahadeen to shoot down Soviet Helicopters and planes which ended that war too. We will see.

Here is an article about the anti-tank weapons I found yesterday:

 

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