ISIS and its affiliates have tagged
Singapore as a target in jihadist publications and videos and plotted
two attacks on the city state, according to a June 2017 government threat assessment report.
The second of these—a plan to launch a rocket at the massive Marina Bay
Sands waterfront resort—was foiled by authorities in Indonesia, where
the would-be attackers were based. Malaysia suffered its first ISIS
attack last June—a grenade injured eight people at a nightspot in the
capital Kuala Lumpur—and disrupted another seven plots in 2016.
Indonesia, the world’s biggest Muslim-majority nation, is
particularly concerned about ISIS using the southern Philippines as a
gateway to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia. The two countries are
separated by poorly policed waters through which militant extremists
can flow. “It’s easy to jump from Marawi to Indonesia,” Indonesia’s
armed forces chief, General Gatot Nurmantyo, told reporters in Jakarta
on June 13.Indonesia also knows what it’s like to be terrorized. In the early 2000s, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a homegrown extremist group allied with al-Qaeda and with cells in neighboring countries, was responsible for a spate of attacks, the deadliest of which were the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people. Like the Mindanao militias, JI’s goal was an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Through a counter-terrorism offensive aided by the U.S., Jakarta eventually broke JI. Now the danger is ISIS, or local extremists inspired by ISIS. In January 2016 ISIS claimed responsibility for a firefight in downtown Jakarta which killed two civilians and injured 20. “In almost every province [of Indonesia] there are already ISIS cells,” General Nurmantyo told reporters. “But they are sleeper cells.”
Though estimates vary, only about 600
Indonesians are thought to be fighting with ISIS in Syria, making them
proportionately one of the least represented nationalities—about two
fighters for every million people, compared to 27 for Denmark and 40 for
Belgium. Even fewer Filipinos are engaged in militant jihad overseas. A
year ago local news agency Rappler reported
that just one Filipino fighter had been confirmed in Syria. However,
Indonesia, a secular democracy, is seeing a rise of right-wing Islamist
politicians and activists. A 2015 Pew survey
found that 4% of the population held a “favorable” view of ISIS. That’s
10 million people. Says Sidney Jones, director of the Jakarta-based
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC): “The mistake [in the
Philippines] has been to see the danger as foreign fighters coming from
Iraq and Syria coming back. The problem is foreign fighters from
Indonesia and Malaysia, very close by, who’ve never set foot in Syria
but who are attracted by the struggle.”
Residents who escaped from Marawi’s inner city are evacuated on June 3. Jes Aznar—Getty Images
For now that struggle revolves around Marawi and
Mindanao. On a recent Saturday, nearly 200 families were squeezed into
Iligan’s rapidly repurposed Buru-un evacuation
center. Some occupied squares of floor space partitioned by wooden
slats and shared with bags, cardboard boxes, and tupperware containers
of milk powder. Others spilled onto an adjacent sports field or baked
under the tarp of U.N. tents. Two weeks earlier, this center had been a
school assembly hall, says camp manager Eva Dela Cruz. It isn’t clear
where these families will, or can, go when classes restart.
While the Marawi militants have targeted
Christians, as elsewhere in the world, the majority of victims of the
Islamist terrorism are Muslims who reject violence. Tens of thousands of
inhabitants have been forced to flee since the fighting broke out.
Many have ended up in evacuation centers like Buru-un. Among those in
limbo is Naima Abdullah, who says that she left the city with her five
children, including a five-month-old baby, her 100-year-old lola (grandmother)
whom she carried on her back, and a live chicken. “We walked for five
hours because there was no transportation available and we had no
money,” she says. “The [youngest] ISIS boys were around 12 or 13 years
old. They had guns. They were wearing black suits with the flags of
ISIS. There were so many armed men. We feared for our lives.”
As uncertain as the future is for Abdullah and her family outside
Marawi, it is more confusing inside the city. The number of ISIS-allied
fighters, as stated in military press briefings, has ranged from 150 to
1,000. At least two deadlines for clearing the city of militants have
elapsed. And while the military officially pegged the death toll
at 290 on June 14—including 26 civilians—both evacuees and army
officials who declined to be named told TIME they thought more than
1,000 people had perished. “There is going to be an epidemic because
there are so many rotting bodies in the streets,” says Norodin Lucman, a
local clan chief and businessman.WATCH: ‘Whatever happens is the will of God’
One critical error appears to be a failure to sufficiently acknowledge or act on the threat posed by ISIS. “We knew this was coming,” says Major-General Carlito Galvez, head of the West Mindanao Command, who seems to imply that Manila downplayed the threat: “The problem is that our economy is booming. When you say that ISIS is here, the investment will change. We don’t want to be affected by that.” Richard Heydarian, an assistant professor of political science at Manila’s De La Salle University, told TIME a few weeks before the Marawi siege: “The Philippines is already getting a lot of bad publicity because of the war on drugs and the sense of a lack of rule of law. The Philippine government has minimal interest in adding another concern for an already jittery business sector of investors and tourists.”
A video obtained by Associated Press shows Hapilon with brothers Omarkhayam and Abdullah Maute discussing plans to capture the city over hand-drawn blueprints of its streets. Despite reports that he was injured—and speculation that he might have been killed—in a February 2016 airstrike, Hapilon appears alive and well. Meanwhile, Maute Group attacks on the smaller Lanao del Sur town of Butig last year seemed, in hindsight, a dress rehearsal for Marawi.
A screengrab from undated footage shows Isnilon Hapilon, center, at a meeting of militants. AP
The battle for Marawi has its roots in the complex and bloody history of Mindanao, where four decades of armed struggle have claimed more than 150,000 lives. According to official tallies, a little over 5% of the Philippines’ total population of 100 million is Moro, a collective term for various Muslim indigenous groups. Most live on Mindanao, where poverty rates are higher and the provision of education is lower than in the rest of the country. The southern Philippines also has a tradition of rido—clan feuds. One of the reasons the militants have been able to hold on for so long, says a military official, is that Marawi’s buildings are replete with hideouts, sniping niches and basement shelters built with clan warfare in mind.
The suffering of the Moro dates back to Spanish and American colonialism—the latter encouraged Catholic Filipinos to populate dissenting Moro lands—and continued through the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, whose soldiers massacred thousands under martial law. Since 1972 the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its offshoot, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), have fought for either greater autonomy or full independence from the central government in Manila. Many Mindanao Muslims had hoped that Duterte—who is from the island and claims Moro blood—would accelerate a sputtering peace process, but that hasn’t happened.
Over the years, various smaller groups have splintered from the MNLF and MILF. Four of these have pledged allegiance to ISIS, according to Jakarta’s IPAC. The biggest of these, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), beheaded two Canadians in 2016 and a German earlier this year, igniting fears of a growing ISIS presence in Mindanao. In April ASG made a brazen attempt to raid the central Philippine tourist island of Bohol, hundreds of kilometers from its jungle lairs on Jolo and Basilan islands in the Sulu archipelago.
Experts say that groups like ASG are motivated more by poverty and political disenfranchisement than militant jihad. During the first six months of 2016, ASG made the equivalent of $7.3 million from ransom, according to a Philippine government report. Suicide bombings are practically unheard of in the Philippines. “Reliance on criminal acts is symptomatic of the lack of ideological commitment by ASG and the largely financial motivations that drive membership,” Joseph Franco, a terrorism expert at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University wrote in an April essay titled Mindanao no place for a caliphate. Franco later told TIME that ISIS responded to Hapilon’s 2014 pledge of allegiance by making him an emir, or commander, but, crucially, stopped short of naming him as governor of his own wilaya, or province, of ISIS. “To be a wilaya, it’s not enough to run around with a flag or behead people,” says Franco. “You have to have a semblance of governance.” Others note that Hapilon, who leads ASG’s Basilan faction—distinct from the more maritime Sulu chapter—has not been involved in any of the recent high-profile kidnap-for-ransom cases. This, they say, should have alerted Philippine authorities that the group was receiving funds from probably foreign sources.
According to Major-General Galvez, ethnic
Tausugs from ASG’s Sulu faction, as well as fighters from smaller
militant groups, coalesced in Marawi. That suggests that in moving from
his Basilan base and allying with Lanao del Sur’s Maute Group, Hapilon
has had some success in overcoming clan and ethnic divisions to unite
pro-ISIS militias.
Displaced residents at a temporary evacuation center on June 10. Richard Atrero de Guzman—NurPhoto/Sipa USA/AP
The Maute Group is newer and less understood, though, according to
Franco, its roots also lie in extortion and criminality. Last November a
former MNLF commander, Omar Ali—who popularly goes by the name
Solitario—went to the foothills of Lanao del Sur’s Butig mountains for a
meeting with Maute brothers Omarkhayam and Abdullah, considered the
masterminds of the assault on Marawi. Earlier that year the Mautes had
led an attack on the town of Butig,
which is about a tenth the size of Marawi, and held out for days
against security forces. In a separate attack, they stormed the Marawi
jail and sprung militants held prisoner there. Solitario, who is in his
60s, had made the journey to persuade the Mautes to lay down arms.Deeply wrinkled under a crisp prayer cap, Solitario has the bearing of a fighter but the slow, careful speech of a diplomat. That November meeting, he tells TIME, was his first encounter with the Maute brothers even though he knew the family well—he had gone to school with their father years before, and his brother was married to a relative of their clan. He also knew the Philippine authorities well: as an MNLF commander, Solitario spent years fighting them. He’d been in Tripoli, Libya, and later in Jakarta for the signing of successive peace agreements, and was a former mayor of Marawi. “I proposed to [the Mautes] to temporarily stop fighting the government until the program of the President, of changing the political structure and system, can be started,” says Solitario, referring to Duterte’s plan to implement federalism in the Philippines, which would give greater autonomy to Mindanao. Should the President not make true on his promise, Solitario told the Maute brothers, they could take up their guns again.
But, says Solitario, the Maute brothers were not interested in compromise or in greater political autonomy for the Maranao. They were against non-Muslims interfering in their affairs. They were also against Shia Muslims and “obstructionist” Sunni Muslims. And they were prepared to kill them. Says Solitario: “[They told me] we have to do a cleansing process. We do not want Muslims to be neutral. They either have to join us or be our opponent: you are with us or you are against us.” Solitario isn’t sure whether the Maute brothers picked up their ideology during their schooling in Jordan and Egypt, or from family connections to Indonesia and possibly JI. Either way, he says, “when they arrived [back from overseas] they brought with them that virus.”
Besides Solitario, most Marawi citizens, Muslims and Christians alike, who tired of conflict and want to defeat that virus. Among them is clan chief Lucman. When the fighting broke out on May 23, some 70 people—mostly Christians—fled to his large house in Marawi. After sheltering them for 10 days and then leading them past Maute checkpoints to safety, Lucman shared his story with TIME. On two occasions, Lucman said, armed men came to his gate asking to come inside. The first time, he didn’t recognize the ISIS fighters. They were not local Maranao, and quoted Koranic verses at him. Lucman, who studied Islamic jurisprudence at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, turned them away. “Nothing comes out of their indoctrination: killing innocent civilians, distorting the teachings of Islam, and destroying their own communities.”
The second time, ISIS sent a Maranao. Lucman recognized the 28-year old in the black uniform as one of his distant relatives. “I said, what are you doing with that gun? He said, this is jihad. I told him, there’s no way you can win, take off your clothes, I will hide you, I will talk to the government for you to surrender. He said: ‘No, I will die.’”
With reporting by Merlyn Manos/Iligan City
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